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Value Divergence in Global Intellectual Property Law
J. JANEWA OSEITUTU *
From the money in our pockets and the goods and services that we use,
to a more peaceful world—the WTO and the trading system offer a
range of benefits . . . . 1
China agreed to a series of intellectual property rights commitments
that will protect American jobs. 2
ABSTRACT
It is a challenge for the United States to adequately protect the interests of its
intellectual property industries. It is particularly difficult to effectively achieve this
objective when the interests of the United States are not in line with the social,
cultural, and economic goals of other nations. Yet, as a major exporter of
intellectual property protected goods, the United States has an interest in
negotiating effective international intellectual property agreements that are
perceived to be legitimate by the state signatories and their constituents. Focusing
on value divergence, this Article contributes to the growing body of literature on
developing a robust but flexible global intellectual property system. The Article
argues that the trade-based approach to global intellectual property law
undermines the apparent gains made in international intellectual property
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WTO
(2008),
1. 10
Benefits
of
the
WTO
Trading
System,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b00_e.htm [hereinafter WTO].
2. China Agrees to Significant Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Initiatives,
Market Opening, and Revisions to Its Indigenous Innovation Policies That Will Help Boost
U.S. Exports at the 21st Session of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and
Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonl
y=true&contentid=2010/12/0663.xml (statement by U.S. Trade Rep. Ron Kirk).
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protection because it promotes a utilitarian economic view of intellectual property
law while minimizing other values. Trade-based intellectual property also reduces
the need for intellectual property interests to align, and therefore fails to achieve
mutually beneficial agreement on substantive intellectual property law and policy.
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INTRODUCTION
In this global era, policy makers, lawyers, and adjudicative bodies must grapple
with the fundamental question of how to reconcile competing values and interests.
This Article uses global intellectual property law as the specific illustration of the
role of values in shaping the law. Intellectual property rights, like real property
rights, are informed by societal values. But the primary international legal
agreement that regulates global intellectual property rights ignores the diverse
national values that influence the ways in which various states determine the
appropriate role for intellectual property in their society. Thus, global intellectual
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property provides an opportunity to reevaluate assumptions about the purpose of
intellectual property laws.
A thirty-year-old computer programmer and avid movie fan residing in the
United States can afford to buy legitimate copies of the latest films even if she is
not quite willing to pay the full price for the goods. Most likely, she is also able to
afford the basic medications she needs to ensure her overall health and well-being.
Now, imagine you are a twenty-two-year-old woman who lives in a small
developing country village. You are delighted to have clean water and are grateful
for your income of approximately eighty cents per day. You love American music,
especially Eminem and Beyoncé, and would love to have their latest albums. You
can buy the authentic version of one of these albums for approximately half your
monthly salary. Alternatively, you can obtain the pirated version for something
equivalent to five days’ work. Yet, you know that copyright infringement is
characterized as stealing, and you know that your government is under a great deal
of pressure to protect copyright. You are therefore inclined to enjoy whatever you
can hear on the radio. Some of the artists might be willing to forego the rents from
your purchase of the legitimate albums, but the record labels and their governments
are not quite so forgiving.
But what if you must choose between purchasing a schoolbook that you need for
your part-time studies at a cost equivalent to two months of your salary and
obtaining photocopies for a fraction of the price? What if you grew up believing in
the value of education as taking priority over everything else? What if the national
conscience is that education is the key to social and economic development, not to
mention national and global success? 3 Your country also strongly values a healthy
population and tries to keep drug prices low so that people can afford their
medications. This scenario illustrates how it becomes more challenging to strike the
appropriate balance between user interests and producer interests in light of the
values 4 and goals of the nation-state.
Intellectual property is a trade priority for the United States because American
exports of copyrighted musical works, films, and literary works can be tremendous
sources of revenue for American industries. 5 The same is true for American

3. Pamela Samuelson, Implications of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights for Cultural Dimensions of National Copyright Laws, 23 J.
CULT. ECON. 95, 103 (1999) (“Some culturally laden rules will likely come under attack as
violations of TRIPS, and some of these challenges may be successful. No WTO member
could expect to justify denying copyright protection to the works of foreign authors on the
ground that the denial would advance a deeply held cultural value of promoting low-cost
education and dissemination of knowledge, as the U.S. did in the nineteenth century.”). But
see James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance in WTO Reform, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 885,
903 (2004) (“[D]eveloping countries are suspicious of a form of development that equates
progress primarily with economic growth achieved through export-led growth, which
excludes attainment in meeting social objectives like education and health.”).
4. The word “values” can be defined in various ways. The English language definition
that best refers to the use of the word “values” in this Article is “consider to be important or
beneficial.” THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 1584 (Judy Pearsall ed., 10th ed. 1999).
5. Amanda Horan, Christopher Johnson & Heather Sykes, Foreign Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Selected U.S. Industries 3 (U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, Office of Industries Working Paper No. ID-14, 2005) (noting that the value added
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pharmaceutical, mechanical, and other technologies. 6 It is not surprising, therefore,
that American industry associations seek to stamp out illegal downloading of music
and films, and to strengthen global border controls so that counterfeit goods and
pirated works can be seized and destroyed. 7 Efforts to change the public perception
of intellectual property infringement are evident from the television and movie
advertisements that characterize copyright infringement as theft, 8 to the Recording
Industry Association of America materials designed to discourage students from
downloading free music. 9
Yet the online piracy problem is so rampant in certain countries that some
companies have attempted to deal with online piracy by acknowledging this reality,
and serving the market rather than fighting it. 10 At the same time, legislation
prohibiting the circumvention of digital locks has heightened concerns about fair
use in copyright law and access to knowledge. 11 With respect to patents,
non-governmental organizations and commentators have raised the alarm about the
implications of patents for public health issues. 12 The public has been made aware
in the U.S. economy due to the film, music, publishing, and entertainment and business
software industries reached $626.2 billion, or 6% of the U.S. economy, in 2002).
6. Id. at 4 (noting that for the pharmaceutical industry, total U.S. production amounted
to an estimated $100 billion in 2001).
7. Id. at 4–5 (noting that estimated losses due to foreign copyright piracy in fifty-two
selected countries amounted to $12.5 billion and that the value of imported goods seized by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection for intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement in
2003 amounted to $94 million).
8. See, e.g., Governments Around the World Take a Stand for Creators, Consumers,
MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/contentprotection/public-serviceannouncements.
9. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), an organization that
represents the majority of American record companies characterizes the illegal downloading
of music as theft. See Scope of the Problem, RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM.,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-theproblem. The counterargument to this is that unlike the theft of physical goods, downloading
free music may deprive the owner from collecting income from the sale of the musical work,
but it does not deprive the owner, or anyone else, from the use and enjoyment of the musical
work. Unlike physical objects, intangible goods cannot be possessed and controlled. See
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031
(2005).
10. David Barboza, Google and Big Music Labels Are Betting on Free Downloads in
TIMES,
Apr. 6,
2009,
at
B4,
available
at
China,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/technology/companies/06music.html (“Last Monday,
the world’s biggest record labels, including EMI, the Warner Music Group and Vivendi’s
Universal Music, said they would seek to profit here by working with Google and offering
free downloads of music to anyone inside China. Google, which has no plans to offer the
service elsewhere, hopes to build traffic and win new advertisers by allowing the Chinese to
search for free music on its site.”).
11. Lea Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On
Copyright and Human Rights, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637, 657 (2009).
12. See Lawrence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 986–88 (2007) (noting the various United Nations
actions and resolutions with respect to access to medicine and intellectual property rights,
based on the work of United Nations officials as well as the work of nongovernmental
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that life-saving medicines are not always accessible to those who need them most
and pharmaceutical companies have had to respond accordingly. There has also
been a resulting wealth of scholarship on access to medicines and access to
knowledge. 13
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 15 is the primary multilateral agreement at
the center of these global controversies. Consumers are not always able to pay the
high prices for patented or copyrighted products, or they may face difficulties in
obtaining the copyrighted information or patented medications they need.
Alternatively, strong intellectual property laws may not be part of the national
value system. Taken together, these factors would make intellectual property
infringement a rational choice. 16 On the other hand, the adequate enforcement of
intellectual property standards is seen as a problem. Indeed, some commentators
identify the enforcement provisions in the TRIPS Agreement as being relatively
weak. 17 The response is to create more rules aimed at enforcement, as the Anti-

organizations); J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 450–51
(2000) (noting developing country concerns about the costs associated with intellectual
property protection, including issues such as access to medicine).
13. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and
the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 171 (2000) (noting the
patent-related health concerns of developing country members not having access to
medicine); Shaver & Sganga, supra note 11, at 639 (suggesting that the “right to take part in
cultural life should be interpreted so as to take advantage of the insights of recent scholarship
on free culture and access to knowledge”); Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents,
and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27,
28–30 (2002) (describing major criticisms of TRIPS in terms of access to medicine and
stating that the safeguards that TRIPS puts in place “increasingly present barriers to
medicine access”); Mary W.S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for
Copyright: From Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775,
778 (2009) (noting that “international copyright system should place greater emphasis on
human rights objectives and norms” with respect to access to knowledge).
14. The World Trade Organization was established in 1994. See General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT 1994].
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320
(1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
16. See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Do As I Say (Not As I Did): Putative
Intellectual Property Lessons for Emerging Economies from the Not So Long Past of the
Developed Nations, 64 S.M.U. L. REV. 923 (2011) (arguing that, on a national scale,
intellectual property piracy has been part of the road to development for various nations). As
an example, Professor Gibbons discusses how American patent law sanctioned the piracy of
European inventions as part of the United States development strategy. Id.
17. Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 37, 42 (2002).
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Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 18 purports to do, or to increase
intellectual property protection as the intellectual property chapter of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) 19 aims to do. But strong enforcement
rules seek to correct a perceived problem without attempting to understand or
address the reasons why various WTO member states, or their citizens, may hold
differing views of intellectual property law and the appropriate balance of interests.
As a major exporter of intellectual property protected goods, 20 the United States
has a clear interest in facilitating the creation of effective international intellectual
property agreements. At a minimum, this requires the conclusion of agreements
that are perceived to be legitimate by the state signatories and their constituents.
This sense of legitimacy will be affected by whether or not the agreements are seen
to be beneficial for all the parties. 21 The challenge for the United States, therefore,
is to effectively protect the interests of its intellectual property industries,
particularly where these interests may not coincide with the social, cultural, and
economic goals of other nations. 22
Scholars have written about the level of flexibility that TRIPS allows, with the
term “TRIPS flexibilities” becoming part of the global intellectual property
narrative. Some scholars express the view that TRIPS has sufficient flexibility,
which should be used, 23 while others observe the inequity in TRIPS and encourage

18. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://www.ustr.gov/acta [hereinafter ACTA].
19. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/tpp
[hereinafter TPP]. On Dec. 14, 2009, the USTR notified Congress of its intent to commence
negotiations. Id. The negotiating partners are the United States, Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The seventh
round of negotiations commenced on June 20, 2011. Id. A leaked copy of the draft
intellectual property chapter is available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf.
20. Bradley S. Butterfield, Kevin J. Mason, Joseph B. Payne & Robert R. Trumble,
Human Resources and Intellectual Property in a Global Outsourcing Environment: Focus
on China, India, and Eastern Europe, 15 INT’L HUM. RES. J. 1, 1 (2006) (stating that
companies in the United States earned $44 billion in royalties and license fees overseas in
2002).
21. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward
a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 278 (1991) (“To be effective, a TRIPS
Agreement must reconcile the needs of both proprietor nations of the West and the
consuming countries of the developing world.”).
22. Id. (“A durable agreement must be based on mutual gain and cannot be imposed by
the information-producing countries on the developing world. Unless the interests of the
information-consuming nations (the developing countries) are considered seriously, a
long-run solution to the problem will not occur. In sum, the major players in the GATT
negotiations must begin to focus on an agreement that promises mutual gain.”).
23. Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A
TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 137, 160–64 (noting that there are
ways to protect traditional knowledge using the existing TRIPS text); Amy Kapczynski,
Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (2009) (suggesting that TRIPS offers
developing countries a greater degree of flexibility in the area of pharmaceuticals than has
been generally recognized).
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a more development-oriented interpretation of TRIPS. 24 Some commentators
advocate a trade-based strategy as an effective way to improve global intellectual
property protection, 25 while others question the legitimacy of TRIPS 26 or its utility
for developing countries. 27 Distinct from the existing literature, this Article
contributes to the discussion on developing a robust but flexible global intellectual
property regime by promoting value divergence as a means to facilitate interest
convergence. The Article argues that the weakness of trade-based intellectual
property is that it obscures the divergent ways in which nations value their
intellectual property. However, taking the value differences into account is essential
to the long-term success of global intellectual property law.
Focusing on the long-term interests of the United States and the other WTO
member states, this Article advocates a change in the direction of global intellectual
property law. Trade-based intellectual property has emphasized a commodityoriented 28 approach to intellectual property that tends to negate the non-economic
contributions of patent and copyright laws. 29 Nonetheless, despite its shortcomings,
TRIPS, and other trade-based intellectual property agreements, should not be
rejected entirely. Rather, the merger between trade and intellectual property should
shift from utilizing trade as a tool to harmonize business-driven intellectual
property laws to an intellectual property sensitive lens that accounts for differences

24. See Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS.
L. REV. 979, 1041–46 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Objectives] (suggestion that Articles 7 and 8
of TRIPS can be used as a “seed” of development); see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 387–89 (2006) [hereinafter Yu,
Discontents] (describing how TRIPS can be interpreted through a “pro-development lens”).
25. Robert J. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and
International Trade in the TRIPs Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in
Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 713, 757–60 (1999) (noting that there is a “long-term potential of
IP to stimulate domestic creativity and attract foreign investment, thereby aiding national
economic development” for developing countries); Leaffer, supra note 21, at 294 (noting
that solutions to piracy problems “must be trade-based and flexible enough to meet the needs
of the international community”).
26. See Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of
Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 681, 724–38 (2006) (noting numerous reasons why the
TRIPS is a contract of adhesion).
27. Id. at 736–37 (stating that the terms in TRIPS are “onerous and unfavorable” for
developing countries).
28. Samuelson, supra note 3, at 96 (“[TRIPS] puts a trade ‘spin’ on intellectual property
rules that have in the past been guided by a host of other principles, including those related
to cultural policies embodied in national laws. This last difference from earlier agreements
may, in the long run, have a profound impact on national intellectual property laws in part
because it may push national laws toward greater commodification of intellectual property
products.” (footnote omitted)).
29. Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 917 [hereinafter Okediji, Public Welfare]
(observing that intellectual property rights have existed for the welfare of the state and that
“[t]he extension of intellectual property rights to the global context, and its rationalization as
a free trade issue, obscures the importance of national conditions and the priority of domestic
welfare goals even where these may be inconsistent with globalization”).
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in national values. 30 In so doing, it would also support the theoretical trade policy
goal of promoting harmonious relationships. 31 In other words, trade-based
intellectual property should shift towards a vision that embraces the diverse goals
and values that national intellectual property regimes may reflect.
Central to this analysis is an acknowledgement of the relevance of the valuedriven interests; including the political, cultural, and economic differences and
motivations of the various actors in the international community. This approach
takes a long-term focus rather than a short-term focus, which makes sense in light
of the long-term nature of these trading relationships. 32
The WTO claims to promote peace by facilitating trade and “providing countries
with a constructive and fair outlet for dealing with disputes over trade issues.” 33
However the trend in global intellectual property appears to be inconsistent with
this theoretical objective of trade law. It is not clear that the current model of traderelated intellectual property fits with the goal of promoting peace 34 and cooperation
rather than primarily serving to protect the business interests of multinational
corporations. 35 Thus, while there may be a shared interest in reaching agreements

30. The ability of the trade regime to incorporate intellectual property, while
recognizing the differences between the two will have an impact on the long-term success of
TRIPS. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of
the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275,
281 (1997) (“Success will depend on how well the GATT/WTO system addresses the
differences between intellectual property and other trade matters.”).
31. WTO, supra note 1 (“History is littered with examples of trade disputes turning into
war. . . . [I]f trade flows smoothly and both sides enjoy a healthy commercial relationship,
political conflict is less likely. What’s more, smoothly flowing trade also helps people all
over the world become better off. People who are more prosperous and contented are also
less likely to fight.”). With respect to developing countries, promoting value divergence and
gradual interest convergence would also be consistent with commitments to assist
developing countries in accordance with GATT (1947) arts. XXXVI and XXXVIII and
GATS art. IV. See infra Part VI.B.
32. WTO, supra note 1 (noting that a short-sighted protectionist view that defends
particular sectors against imports ignores how other countries are going to respond). The
WTO recognizes the value of long-term thinking, acknowledging that “[t]he longer term
reality is that one protectionist step by one country can easily lead to retaliation from other
countries.”). The WTO purports, therefore, to seek a win-win situation.
33. Id. (emphasis omitted). Whether or not one accepts this as the truth or as rhetoric,
promoting peace remains one of the theoretical aspirations of trade law. As long as this is a
stated goal, then trade agreements should be held accountable to this standard. Avoiding
trade disputes and conflicts would militate in favor of balanced agreements that benefit all
parties involved rather than agreements that are primarily aimed at protecting the interests of
industrialized nations.
34. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 56–59 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing the
theoretical understanding that trade promotes peace). Of course, as the authors note,
promoting peace is not the only foreign policy goal of international trade. For instance, U.S.
trade policy goals may include building allies or pressuring countries to change their
policies. Id. at 59.
35. Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 29, at 858–59 (“While the TRIPS negotiations
ostensibly took place between state actors, the driving force of the negotiations were private
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that facilitate trade in intellectual property goods, there may be distinct societal
objectives for intellectual property law, even for those countries with similar levels
of economic development. These differences have value, and are relevant because
intellectual property is unlike traditional trade subject matter. 36 Intellectual property
policy could be narrowly construed as purely economic policy. However it does not
have to be necessarily so confined. For a given nation, it can be an important part
of cultural policy, educational policy, or economic development policy.
Part I of this Article explains the incorporation of intellectual property into the
trade agenda as a deliberate strategy to avoid the need to agree on mutually
beneficial intellectual property policies. As part of this discussion, the Article
identifies some of the differences between traditional trade subject matter and
intellectual property. In Part II of the Article, value divergence and gradual interest
convergence are proposed as an alternative strategy for strengthening the
international intellectual property regime. Part III of the Article outlines the
disturbing trend towards increased intellectual property protection and the role of
the economically powerful nations in setting global intellectual property norms.
Part IV of the Article utilizes WTO disputes involving China and Canada to
illustrate how value differences surface in the TRIPS context. Both of these
countries have been identified by the United States as being among the most
egregious violators of American intellectual property rights. 37 Finally, the Article
explains how value divergence is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement and how it
can gradually lead to the convergence of intellectual property interests.
I. TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A STRATEGIC DECISION WITH A
SHORT-TERM VISION
This discussion primarily focuses on intellectual property treaties such as TRIPS
(the “Agreement”), and bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements that are premised
on trade liberalization. Despite the proliferation of trade-related intellectual
property agreements, TRIPS remains the most significant multilateral intellectual
property agreement. Hence, it is the focal starting point for this value divergence
analysis. In particular, the Article discusses copyright and patent law because these
areas of intellectual property law have the greatest implications for human
development, including access to new technologies and knowledge goods.

actors, specifically intellectual property industries and their associated lobbies.”); Susan K.
Sell, Industry Strategies for Intellectual Property and Trade: The Quest for TRIPS, and
Post-TRIPS Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 79, 81–86 (2002). It is not only
TRIPS that has been questioned, but the entire WTO trading regime. However, this Article
will focus on trade-related intellectual property rather than on the WTO regime in general.
See Gathii, supra note 3, at 908 (“To address the WTO's legitimacy crisis, there is a real
need to make the trading system work for all countries, and that means a good-faith effort to
address these substantive issues of concern to developing countries.”).
36. See infra Part III.
37. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 5 (Apr. 30, 2010)
[hereinafter 301 REPORT].
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A. Brief Background to TRIPS
The trade-based approach to global intellectual property is based on the shortterm economic interests of intellectual property-producing nations. For instance,
the stated rationale for protecting American intellectual property overseas is that
infringing activity causes financial losses for rights holders, and “undermines key
U.S. comparative advantages in innovation and creativity to the detriment of
American businesses and workers.” 38
In the shift to an information economy, the United States became more
concerned about protecting its intangible rights. 39 Developing countries were seen
as the primary offenders. 40 However, prior attempts at creating a global intellectual
property regime within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) were
unsuccessful partly due to disagreement about whether restricting competition to
protect intellectual property profits enhances the welfare of the consuming public. 41
Hence, the use of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
identified as a solution to weak intellectual property rights in developing
countries. 42 The GATT would assist the intellectual property-producing nations in
ensuring that their intellectual property rights would be protected overseas. 43
While supporting the use of the GATT framework, some scholars recognized
that high intellectual property standards should be a long-term objective and that it
would be necessary to take into account the “countervailing interests of the
developing nations whose exigent economic interests differ from those of the

38. Id. at 5. The report also suggests links between intellectual property piracy and
organized crime, as well as threats to public safety. Id. at 10–11, 45. Finally, it is suggested
that piracy “hinders the sustainable economic development of other countries.” Id. at 5.
39. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 274 (“In its progressive shift to an information-based
economy, the United States has become increasingly vulnerable to piracy, expropriation, and
otherwise inadequate protection of its intellectual property in certain foreign countries.”
(footnote omitted)). The perception that strong intellectual property rights are a critical
element of American comparative advantage remains true today. See, for example, a May
17, 2011 letter from various senators to President Obama, urging him to ensure that the TPP
includes high standards of intellectual property protection. The senators wrote, “A robust
knowledge economy provides the United States with one of our largest sources of
competitive advantage, and intellectual property is the engine that drives it. Put bluntly,
intellectual property equals jobs.” Hatch, Cantwell Lead Bipartisan Group of Senators in
Calling on President to Maintain Strong IP Rights in Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
U.S.
SENATE
COMM.
ON
FIN.,
Agreement,
THE
http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=9bcacbf4-3041-49ad-b4cd6cd9bbad55a4.
40. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 281–88.
41. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 281 (“Intellectual property regimes were
initially to be integrated by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). For many
years, that effort was stalled in part because its members could not agree on issues such as
whether (and when) consumer welfare is enhanced by sacrificing competition to protect
profits in creative efforts.”).
42. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 276–77.
43. Id. at 299–300.
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West.” 44 Professor Leaffer therefore suggested a two-tier system that would allow
lower levels of protection for developing countries. 45 The United States’
negotiating position during the Uruguay round, however, was that developing
countries should not receive differential treatment. 46 Nonetheless, developing
countries and least developed countries were ultimately given a delayed
implementation period. 47
B. Strategic Advantages of the Trade-Based Strategy
TRIPS was the first major step towards harmonizing global intellectual property
standards in a trade-based regime. The Agreement covers seven categories of
intellectual property, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and geographical
indications. 48 The international agreements that existed prior to TRIPS, such as the
Berne Convention 49 and the Paris Convention, 50 were independent of the regime
for the regulation of international trade. From the perspective of the United States,
these treaties were inadequate because they did not establish substantive norms, nor
did they have any effective enforcement mechanism. 51 The WIPO was also seen as
a forum that was sympathetic to developing countries and those who do not favor a
pro-intellectual property stance. 52 The use of a trade-based approach through the
WTO was a way to overcome the difficulty of having to accommodate and address
these differences. 53
The enforceability of the agreements that were part of the WTO framework was
also perceived to be an advantage for the demandeurs of increased intellectual
property protection. Compared to other areas of international law, the WTO has a
relatively well-developed dispute resolution system. 54 To the extent that

44. Id. at 278.
45. Id. at 306–07 (recommending a transitional period for developing countries,
Professor Leaffer states that “[a] system that does not take into account the differing cultural,
economic, and moral aspirations of the developing countries will be doomed to failure and
will not be enforced effectively by those countries on which it is imposed”).
46. Id. at 306.
47. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 66. This period was subsequently extended for least
developed countries. See infra note 280.
48. Id. arts. 1.2, 2, 9, 15, 22 & 27.
49. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986)
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
50. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
51. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 293–94.
52. See Andrew J. Grotto, Organizing for Influence: Developing Countries,
Non-Traditional Intellectual Property Rights and the World Intellectual Property
Organization, 8 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 359, 372 (2004).
53. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 294.
54. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
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international law can be enforced, trade rules have been enforced through the use of
GATT panels and, subsequently, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 55
The implementation of a dispute settlement recommendation can be reviewed, 56
and if a member state fails to comply with the rules, affected states can be
authorized to retaliate by withdrawing trade concessions, for example. 57 In practice,
a WTO member can choose to ignore a panel or Appellate Body ruling. 58
Nonetheless, WTO members can resort to the WTO dispute resolution mechanism
as a way to promote compliance with the intellectual property minimum
standards. 59
Thus, incorporating intellectual property into the trade agenda was a deliberate
strategy that appears to have successfully eliminated the need to find points of
mutual interest in intellectual property law and policy. 60 Because the focus shifted
to reaching agreement on trade, it reduced the need to negotiate agreement on
mutually satisfactory intellectual property norms and subsumed divergent national
intellectual property values within the larger trade agenda. 61
This strategy enabled countries with strong intellectual property industries, like
the United States, to make trade-offs with countries without intellectual property
intensive industries. 62 The advantage of linking trade to intellectual property rights
is that it created an incentive for WTO members to conclude an agreement, even if
they were not intellectual property producers or did not see TRIPS as beneficial for
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. A list of disputes is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
55. Id. art. 2.
56. Id. art. 21.
57. Id. art. 22.
58. The extent to which an individual state can choose to do so will depend on whether
or not it can afford to do so. This may depend on whether or not it can, for example, afford
to pay fines that may be levied and how much it needs access to the markets of the other
state as compared to the level of demand for access to its own markets.
59. See id. art. 3.
60. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5 (2000) (discussing
the role of the United States in initiating the process of moving intellectual property
standards into the GATT Uruguay Round Negotiations); Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note
29, at 846–48 (discussing the use of threats of trade sanctions to pressure developing
countries into the TRIPS negotiations).
61. Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 29, at 853–55 (noting, with respect to developed
countries, the differing underlying philosophies of intellectual property protection between
the European Community and the United States and that “[t]he disparities between
intellectual property policies of developed countries were strategically obscured during the
TRIPS negotiations given the primary (and shared) goal of strengthening rights in the global
market”) (footnote omitted).
62. One such area of importance to developing countries is agriculture. Gathii, supra
note 3, at 887, 908–10. However, the gains that were expected have not been made. See id.
(pointing out that agriculture and commodity trade have been exempted from free trade
while areas in which developed countries have comparative advantage have been favored.
Professor Gathii explains how the agriculture and commodity markets, where developing
countries have an advantage, continue to benefit from protectionism in developed countries.
Trade liberalization in these areas would benefit developed countries. However, this has not
happened.).
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them. Countries negotiated intellectual property rights in order to secure gains in
agriculture, textiles, and market access. Importantly, any nation that wanted to be
part of the WTO had to agree to TRIPS. 63 This is both the strength and weakness of
this trade-based approach.
C. Flaws in the Trade-Based Strategy
International treaties are based on the notion of consent. 64 One may fairly
assume, therefore, that the conclusion of an international agreement implies that
there was agreement on the substantive issues that the treaty addresses and that all
parties to the negotiation fully understood what the agreement was about. Yet,
TRIPS exists because there were reasons to agree on a broader trade agenda rather
than a shared interest in the intellectual property outcome. 65 Contrary to the values
of win-win, fairness, and cooperation that are espoused by the WTO, 66 the TRIPS

63. TRIPS was part of a single undertaking, meaning that it was not possible to join the
WTO and opt out of TRIPS. GATT 1994, supra note 14, art. II.2. TRIPS was not an optional
agreement but rather, once a state became part of the WTO, it had to accept the WTO
Agreement and the required annexes, including TRIPS. Id.
64. See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of
International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 169–70
(1996) (stating that there is a “notion of consent” in the law of treaties).
65. Whether or not trade agreements generally represent a fair bargain remains open to
debate. Development scholars have been critical of the benefit of free trade for developing
economies. See, e.g., HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: RICH NATIONS, POOR POLICIES,
AND THE THREAT TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD 73–74 (“In recommending free trade to
developing countries, the Bad Samaritans point out that all the rich countries have free(ish)
trade. This is, however, like people advising the parents of a six-year-old boy to make him
get a job, arguing that successful adults don’t live off their parents and, therefore, that being
independent must be the reason for their successes. They do not realize that those adults are
independent because they are successful, and not the other way around. In fact, most
successful people are those who have been well supported . . . . Likewise . . . the rich
countries liberalized their trade only when their producers were ready, and usually only
gradually even then. In other words, historically, trade liberalization has been the outcome
rather than the cause of economic development.” (emphasis in original)). Professor Chang
goes on to argue that while free trade may be a good short-term strategy, poor countries will
increase their respective consumption, which is not a good way to develop the economy. Id.
at 74.
66. For instance, the principles of non-discrimination as set out in GATT Article I
(most-favored-nation treatment) and Article III (national treatment) are fundamental
obligations of international trade. Further, the dispute settlement mechanism is set up to
promote cooperation among WTO member states, encouraging them—where they deviate—
to bring their laws into compliance with their WTO obligations. See DSU, supra note 54, art.
3.4 (“Recommendations or rulings of the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this
Understanding and under the covered agreements.”); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 143 (2008) (“One of the principal goals of the
WTO is to promote a fair and neutral system of multilateral trade.”).
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Agreement was not driven by the need to achieve a winning solution for all nations,
or even for the majority of nations. 67
This might be seen as the quid pro quo and therefore a fair bargain. If some
countries negotiated a poor bargain, perhaps it is their loss. But, if one takes that
attitude to long-term trading relationships, how does that affect the outcome and the
dynamics of the relationships? One can anticipate a relatively negative effect. 68 The
implementation and enforcement of global intellectual property standards can be
attained by employing a strategy that generates resistance and resentment towards
the demandeurs of increased intellectual property protection. Alternatively, the
demandeurs of intellectual property protection can take a long-term view to the
protection of their interests and their relationship with nations that, based on their
national values, calibrate the intellectual property balance differently.
One might also counter that it is sufficient to have trade-based agreement even if
there is disagreement on substantive intellectual property law or policy. This is,
arguably, simply part of the reality of how international negotiations work. Indeed,
it may be an effective short-term strategy. However, as much as the intellectual
property-producing nations may seek to have all nations implement high levels of
intellectual property protection, the trade-based strategy that was the basis of
TRIPS is proving to be effective only to a certain extent. 69 The long list of
countries on the United States Special 301 Watch List indicates that the goal of
getting countries to change their intellectual property practices is an ongoing
effort. 70 Moreover, it has been suggested that TRIPS is in crisis. 71
Even assuming that all the TRIPS parties understood, and accepted, the bargain
that was being made, the TRIPS bargain—or at least the way it has been interpreted
and applied—is rather lopsided in favor of rights holders. 72 Thus, it is not
necessarily a question of renegotiating the agreement, but rather of interpreting and
applying the agreement in accordance with the negotiated balance contained
therein. Importantly, TRIPS started a trend, which has been continued through

67. CORREA, supra note 60, at 3 (noting that industrialized countries adopted higher
intellectual property standards only after they had achieved a certain level of technological
development); see also Leaffer, supra note 21, at 299–300.
68. Gathii, supra note 3, at 887 (“Indeed, if the trade agenda also continues to expand
into only those areas in which developed countries have a comparative advantage while
leaving unaddressed outstanding issues within existing agreements that currently are inimical
to the interests of developing countries, this expansion will erode the gains of any reforms
aimed at the effective and full participation of developing countries and citizens in both the
decision and policy making aspects of the WTO.”).
69. See, e.g., Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China-U.S. Panel
Report].
70. 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 19–40 (noting the countries that are on the priority
watch list and watch list).
71. Yu, Objectives, supra note 24, at 1024 (arguing that there is a tendency “to overlook
the fact that the TRIPS Agreement is now in a deepening crisis”).
72. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without
Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 449 (2007).
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bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, of treating intellectual property as a
trade matter.
Yet, as the next Part argues, intellectual property law is distinct from the
traditional trade subject matter. 73 Among the WTO agreements, intellectual
property stands apart as an area of substantive national law that has been
incorporated into the WTO agreements and standardized on the basis that it is
“trade-related.” 74 However, the challenge inherent in this trade-based strategy is
that domestic intellectual property laws, like domestic property laws, are shaped by
national values and goals. These value differences do not vanish simply because
they have been ignored.
II. TRIPS COMPARED TO OTHER WTO AGREEMENTS
This Part introduces some of the challenges of merging trade and intellectual
property and briefly compares intellectual property to traditional international trade
subject matter. Trade rules seek to regulate the exchange of commodities between
sovereign states. Trade rules, generally speaking, harmonize procedures that favor
transparency and competition. The WTO agreements cover subjects like tariffs,
rules of origin, 75 technical barriers to trade, 76 customs valuation, and subsidies,
among others. 77 The fundamental obligations under the WTO are to provide
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment to foreign goods. 78 The
WTO agreements also aim to ensure transparency of rules and the availability of
judicial procedures. 79 The rules on substantive areas of law like health and
environmental law or investment law, for example, are, in stark contrast to TRIPS,

73. Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 29, at 917 (“Intellectual property rights have
historically been justified by reference to national priorities unlike the free trade ideal, which
from its earliest articulation, has treated national and global interests as interdependent parts
of the welfare calculus. . . . In its long history, intellectual property rights have existed
primarily for the welfare of the state. The extension of intellectual property rights to the
global context, and its rationalization as a free trade issue, obscures the importance of
national conditions and the priority of domestic welfare goals even where these may be
inconsistent with globalization.”).
74. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 66, at 7 (noting that “national laws
regulating trade in most cases are implementations of international obligations that have their
origin on the international level”) (emphasis omitted).
75. See GATT 1994, supra note 14; Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Rules of Origin].
76. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter Agreement on Technical Barriers].
77. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
78. See GATT 1994, supra note 14, arts. I, III.
79. See, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. 2–3, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
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fairly minimal. This is undoubtedly due in part to some recognition of the
difficulties inherent in imposing or prescribing substantive norms at the
international level in respect of matters of policy typically left to national
governments.
A. The TRIMs Agreement and the SPS Agreement
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) only applies to
investment measures that are related to trade in goods. 80 It does not set out any
substantive minimum standards for investment measures but requires national
treatment, meaning that there should be no discrimination against foreign goods,
and prohibits quantitative restrictions. 81 In other words, there is a general
prohibition on protectionism but the standard exceptions that are normally allowed
in trade law would apply. 82 Thus, there is a relatively high level of flexibility to
allow for national differences.
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)
affirms the right of members to take measures to protect human, animal, and plant
life or health. 83 With respect to harmonization, the SPS Agreement prohibits WTO
members from “arbitrarily or unjustifiably” discriminating between member states
“where identical or similar conditions prevail.” 84 On harmonization, the SPS
Agreement requires that WTO member states “base their sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they
exist.” 85 WTO member states are also to accept the sanitary and phytosanitary
standards of other member states as equivalent “even if these measures differ from
their own or from those used by other Members trading in the same product” if
certain conditions are met. 86 Like TRIMs, the SPS Agreement has a fair amount of
flexibility.
B. The TRIPS Agreement
By comparison, TRIPS not only requires national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment but also establishes minimum standards for
intellectual property protection. 87 The core trade commitments of national

80. See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868
U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
81. Id. art. 2.
82. Id. art. 3.
83. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
84. Id. art. 2.3. Article 3 of TRIMs provides that “[a]ll exceptions under GATT 1994
shall apply, as appropriate, to the provisions of this Agreement.” TRIMs Agreement, supra
note 80, art. 3.
85. SPS Agreement, supra note 83, art. 3.1.
86. Id. art. 4.1.
87. TRIPS, supra note 15, arts. 3–4, 9–40.
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treatment and most-favored-nation treatment are arguably the two obligations that
address obstacles to trade. 88 This is because these fundamental obligations address
conditions that affect competition between domestic and foreign goods with a view
to ensuring that the law does not favor domestic producers or privilege some
nations to the exclusion of others. 89 The minimum standards of TRIPS aim to
protect innovation by curbing free-riding. 90 However, while free-riding may be a
problem for investors in new and innovative goods, it does not necessarily result in
differential treatment of foreign and domestic goods. 91 If copying is tolerated for all
producers, then the national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations are met.
The core trade law principles of national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment do not require that all nations have a certain minimum level of
intellectual property protection. In this way, TRIPS goes beyond what the
traditional trade system seeks to achieve.
Although there are major intellectual property treaties that predate TRIPS, 92 the
Agreement is significant because, while it does not mandate deep harmonization, 93
it establishes enforceable intellectual property rules, the enforceability being a
significant change. 94 Thus, minimum standards were established to a greater degree
than existed before and this harmonizing aspect was reinforced by virtue of dispute
settlement rules that require compliance. 95 This means that all WTO member states
are required to implement domestic intellectual property laws that are consistent
with TRIPS.
The TRIPS Agreement requires all member states to provide minimum terms of
protection and, among other things, prohibits members from excluding certain
technologies from protection. 96 For example, the minimum term of protection for
patents is twenty years from the date of filing. 97 Prior to TRIPS, there was no

88. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 279.
89. GATT 1994, supra note 14, arts. I, III.
90. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 279 (citing TRIPS, supra note 15, arts. 3,
9, 15, 39).
91. Id. (“[B]ecause a country’s refusal to protect against copyists leaves all innovators
operating within that country on something of an equal footing, the absence of intellectual
property protection is not a direct barrier to international trade.”). But see Samuelson, supra
note 3, at 99–100 (discussing how continental European moral rights in the copyright context
can be a barrier to trade because, for instance, the artist can prevent modification to the work
after sale).
92. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 49; Paris Convention, supra note 50.
93. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J.
85, 86 (2007).
94. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 277 (identifying enforceability as one of
the significant achievements of TRIPS); see also Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 93, at 89
(explaining that TRIPS established minimum standards but did not require “deep
harmonization”).
95. CORREA, supra note 60, at 2 (explaining that the enforcement provisions of TRIPS
were a significant departure from the prior intellectual property treaties).
96. TRIPS, supra note 15, arts. 12–13, 30, 33.
97. Id. art. 33.
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minimum term of patent protection. 98 TRIPS also incorporates a minimum
fifty-year term of protection for copyright 99 and requires patent protection to be
available for all fields of technology. 100 This is over and above the obligations to
provide national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment to all other WTO
member states. 101 Moreover, defining minimum enforceable standards can create
both theoretical and practical problems. 102
III. HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DIFFERS FROM TRADITIONAL TRADE IN GOODS
Given the ways in which intellectual property differs from traditional trade
subject matter, it is curious that TRIPS goes beyond the other WTO agreements to
harmonize substantive minimum standards to the extent that it does.
First, intellectual property can implicate trade in goods, services, foreign direct
investment, and technology transfer. 103 Intellectual property rights may relate to the
goods or services. 104 However, through technology transfer, intellectual property
may also be the subject of the exchange—although no physical item necessarily
passes hands. This is because it is only the legal fiction that is involved.
Second, modern trade is about exchanging goods and services in the global
marketplace. Yet copyright and patented goods may be, but are not necessarily,
goods that are traded in the marketplace. In other words, they may have value that
is not market-related. For instance, copyrighted goods are knowledge goods 105 as
well as artistic creations. The value in copyright may include the right to preserve
the integrity of the work or the right of the creator to be identified, or not identified,
as the author of the work. 106 There may also be, for example, cultural value placed
on a creative artwork, and it may be offensive to sell it in the market place. 107

98. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 50.
99. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 12.
100. Id. art. 27.
101. Id. arts. 3–4. Most-favored-nation status requires that nations extend any advantage
or favor conferred on one WTO member states to all other WTO member states. Id. art. 4.
102. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 302 (suggesting that that TRIPS could
have a significantly different impact on developing countries than the other WTO
Agreements. In particular, the cost of setting up copyright, trademark, and patenting offices,
as well as the costs involved in monitoring and enforcing intellectual property rights is
significant).
103. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 66, at 10.
104. For instance, a business may hold trademark rights that distinguish its goods and
services from those of other businesses, patent rights for a particular technology, or
copyright protection for a literary or artistic work.
105. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 806–07 (2007).
106. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
107. For example, for its most significant cultural treasures, Japan “impose[s] restrictions
upon conservation and use of tangible objects, including their acquisition, protection,
maintenance, alterations, repairs and exportation.” Geoffrey R. Scott, A Comparative View of
Copyright as Cultural Property in Japan and the United States, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
283, 313 (2006) [hereinafter Scott, Cultural Property]; see also Bunkazai Hogo-ho [Law for
the Protection of Cultural Properties], Law No. 214 of 1950, arts. 34-2 to 47 (Japan)
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Third, many things determine levels of intellectual property protection,
including social and cultural values. Intellectual property policies reflect societal
values, not unlike domestic health policies or cultural policies. 108 Patent and
copyright laws are substantive domestic law and are territorial in nature. These
laws must be capable of accommodating changes in domestic public policy as well
as technological and social changes in that society. 109 This close connection
between societal goals and values makes the convergence of intellectual property
interests essential to the long-term success of global intellectual property law.
Imagine if all nations had to adhere to a set of global real property standards. 110
Imagine if these nations had to agree, for example, that communal property would
no longer be tolerated and all nations would be required to follow the English
model because foreign property systems were causing tremendous financial losses
for wealthy English real estate investors who engage in significant cross-border
transactions. One might ask why there should be no communal property and how
this kind of harmonized system would account for cultural and value differences.
Intellectual property laws, like real property laws, are shaped by national values. It
is true that real property, like land, cannot move across borders like intangible
property and may not have reason to find its way into a trade agreement. However,
in an information age where intangible property has become an increasingly
important currency, the movement of intangible goods from one value system to
another requires an acknowledgement of the differences between these systems,
even if the basic legal standards have been harmonized.
Finally, various commentators have pointed out the irony of trade liberalization
serving as a tool to create frameworks that facilitate monopolies. 111 It has been
observed that intellectual property rights are the opposite of free trade because they

[hereinafter The 1950 Law], available at http://www.tobunken.go.jp/~kokusen/ENGLISH/D
ATA/Htmlfg/japan/japan01.html.
108. For instance, depending on the underlying philosophy, a nation could support a
public health care system, while other nations view private healthcare as the better option.
109. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual Property:
True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 722 (2007) (“Patents and
copyrights, as instruments to promote progress in science and the arts, must be flexible and
responsive to changes in technology, economic considerations, and public policy.”).
110. Some scholars have pointed out the perils of treating intellectual property like real
property and comparing the two. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 25–31 (2004). However, because copyright,
patent, and trademark have become increasingly “propertized,” the property analogy remains
helpful. See id. at 8–22; Menell, supra note 109, at 720–21 (2007) (“Notwithstanding
observations by several scholars that the term ‘intellectual property’ originated recently, the
courts and legislatures have long considered patents, copyrights, and trademarks to be
‘property’ . . . . There can be little question today that intellectual property assets are forms
of ‘property.’” (footnotes omitted)).
111. E.g. Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 207
(2006) [hereinafter Chander, Exporting DMCA] (referring to the DMCA provisions
contained in several U.S. bilateral trade agreements, Professor Chander observes that
“[t]here is a special irony that free trade might lead to a legal framework that facilitates
monopolies in the after-market” (emphasis in original)); Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note
30, at 280.
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reflect limited monopolies rather than liberalization. 112 The goal of the WTO is to
facilitate competition on a global level, 113 yet intellectual property rights, taken to
the extreme, can be anticompetitive. 114 Interestingly, TRIPS has been characterized
as promoting competition. 115 However, there are differing conceptions of the
trade-distorting effects of intellectual property rights. For example, the United
States has interpreted weak intellectual property protection as trade distortion due
to the loss of comparative advantage. 116 India, on the other hand, has interpreted
trade distortion as government interference in the marketplace in order to protect
intellectual property rights. 117
Despite its shortcomings, the reality is that trade-related intellectual property is
here to stay. Nonetheless, it is a significant failure for TRIPS to be perceived as an
agreement that lacks benefit for the citizens of many countries. The question is how
best to make trade-related intellectual property work effectively for all nations. The
next Part of this Article discusses how fostering value divergence can lead to
gradual interest convergence.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
THROUGH VALUE DIVERGENCE
Societal goals and values influence the national and global intellectual property
narrative. Strengthening global intellectual property law therefore requires better
accommodation of national values. 118 The word “values” can be defined in various
ways. The phrase “societal values” as used in this Article refers to the principles or
objectives that a nation-state considers important. For example, one could place
value on access to low-cost educational materials and low-cost medicine, or on
promoting technology and supporting the entertainment industry. In considering the
interests of the intellectual property rights holder vis-à-vis other interests, states
recognize that intellectual property rights are not absolute. They are subject to
limitations and exceptions. 119 These include limitations such as the length of
protection or exceptions such as fair use in copyright law or research exceptions in
patent law. 120

112. See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 213, 223 (1996).
113. What
Is
the
World
Trade
Organization?,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm.
114. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid
Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2006) (noting the tension between antitrust law and
intellectual property law).
115. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 280.
116. Id. at 281 n.14.
117. Id.
118. See Doris Estelle Long, Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing the Policies of
Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 239 (“If global integration is to
continue and regionalism is to takes its place as a support (and not a counter) to
globalization, ‘local’ concerns must be addressed in global processes that acknowledge and
give value to such concerns.”).
119. See Carrier, supra note 110, at 82–144.
120. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1).
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The challenge of reaching agreement despite conflicting interests and cultural
differences is unique neither to international intellectual property law nor to
international treaty making. Dispute resolution literature, for instance, recognizes
the utility of seeking mutually beneficial results. 121 The focus is on interests rather
than on conflicting positions because the problem often lies in the conflict
“between each side’s needs, desires, concerns, and fears.” 122 It may not always be
apparent what the shared interests are. 123 Nonetheless, looking for shared interests
can assist the parties to the negotiation to create options that are mutually
satisfactory. 124
Underlying many of the arguments in favor of a more balanced global regime is
the theme of achieving a greater degree of fairness for all involved. 125 Arguments
for change that aim to increase fairness by taking into account the views and
circumstances of those who are politically and economically disadvantaged,
whether states or individuals, appeal to higher moral principles, human rights, and
the benevolent nature of human kind. These arguments are valuable and necessary.
Unfortunately, in a market-driven global system, such appeals may prove to be less
persuasive than the appeal of short-term economic gain. This is why, in pursuing
and promoting a fair and balanced global intellectual property regime, there is
utility in acknowledging the role of interest convergence in facilitating change. 126

121. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 70 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
122. Id. at 40. “Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of
positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused
you to so decide.” Id. at 41.
123. Id. at 71.
124. Id. at 70–80. “In a complex situation, creative inventing is an absolute necessity. In
any negotiation it may open doors and produce a range of potential agreements satisfactory
to each side. Therefore, generate many options . . . . Look for shared interests and differing
interests to dovetail. And seek to make their decision easy.” Id. at 79–80.
125. See generally CORREA, supra note 60, at 5; Harris, supra note 26.
126. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–25 (1980). Professor Bell argues that Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was not the product of some newly found morality and a
desire to do the right thing, but rather, a combination of factors made the decision in favor of
racially integrated schools more appealing than it otherwise might have been. Bell, supra at
524. According to Professor Bell, the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown came at a time
when it had economic and political value. Id. at 524–25. For instance, the NAACP and the
federal government took the position that the Brown decision helped provide credibility to
the United States as it competed with Communist countries to win over third world
countries. Id. In addition, U.S. prestige and leadership in international circles had been
damaged by U.S. segregation, particularly in light of the U.S. principle that all men are
created equal. Id. Further, the Brown decision had value for African American veterans who
had fought in World War II. Id. Finally, continued segregation was seen as a barrier to
further industrialization in the southern United States. Id.; see also Richard Delgado,
Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes—Interest Convergence and Civil
Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 369 (2002) (“[C]oncern for international
appearances drove domestic policy during this period.”). This is not to suggest that racial
differences are relevant to the global intellectual property dynamic. However, parallels can
be drawn between domestic racial disparities and global cultural and value differences.
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The notion of interest convergence as a catalyst for change reflects the world as it is
rather than the world as it should be. 127 In this sense, it tends to be a more realist
vision of how change can be achieved, particularly where there is an imbalance of
political or economic power or where cultural differences may be significant. 128
In the international intellectual property context, negotiations take place
between countries with significantly different levels of industrialization, disparities
in economic wealth, and, in some cases, distinct or conflicting views about the
appropriate role for intellectual property. 129 This makes it difficult to achieve
agreement, and it requires compromise on the part of the various actors. Indeed,
this difficulty in agreeing on intellectual property standards is part of the reason
why intellectual property was moved into the trade framework.
However, the treatment of copyright and patent industries exclusively from a
trade perspective may fail to achieve a positive long-term outcome. This is because
a narrow trade focus neglects the non-commodity value that nations may attach to
intellectual property rights. 130 An objective of intellectual property policy in some

127. See Bell, supra note 126, at 523, 526 (explaining that in the context of racially
integrated schools, the competing values were the conflicting interests of blacks who were
interested in desegregating schools and whites who preferred to maintain the existing
policies); Delgado, supra note 126, at 371 (explaining that the “interest convergence”
approach “acknowledges that race and racism are ideas and thus, in some sense, under our
control, but holds that material factors, including competition for jobs, social and pecuniary
advantage, and the class interest of elite groups . . . play an even larger role”). This is not to
suggest that race is a factor in international intellectual property negotiations. What I am
suggesting is that it is important to acknowledge that where there are conflicting economic
interests or power dynamics, meaningful change requires a confluence of the interests of the
parties involved.
128. See Bell, supra note 126, at 523 (positing, in the context of racial integration, that
the principle of interest convergence provides that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving
racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites”).
In the context of global intellectual property law, the principle of interest convergence can be
applied to support the notion that the interests of developing countries (as the politically and
economically weaker actors) in shaping intellectual property laws to suit their needs will be
better accommodated to the extent their intellectual property interests converge with those of
industrialized countries (as the politically and economically stronger actors). It can also be
said, however, that the interests of intellectual-property-producing countries in protecting
and selling their intellectual property goods will be advanced when they recognize the need
to find areas where their interests converge with those nations who are not major producers
of intellectual property protected goods.
129. There
are
153
WTO
member
states.
Who
We
Are,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm.
Approximately
two-thirds of the WTO members are developing countries. Overview, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm.
130. See 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 5. For instance, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) describes innovation and creativity as “essential to our prosperity
and to the support of countless jobs in the United States” and focuses on the effect of
intellectual property infringement on legitimate businesses. Id. However, intellectual
property rights are not necessarily limited to goods that are the subject of trade, or economic
rights. See Berne Convention, supra note 49, art. 6 bis, which provides for the protection of
authors’ moral rights. Increasingly, there are discussions about the protection of traditional
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countries is to protect cultural goods primarily for reasons unrelated to their market
value. 131 This affects the assessment of the national intellectual property balance.
Thus, in the context of global intellectual property agreements that involve multiple
countries, it is underinclusive to have a focus that is predominantly economic and
commodity-oriented.
An inclusive mutual-interest-seeking strategy can be supported by both moral
arguments and by rational self-interest. When interests converge, parties with
cultural and economic barriers, and with potentially conflicting agendas, can work
towards mutually satisfactory progress. Global intellectual property negotiations
require the development of policy across cultural and economic differences. In
order to effectively harmonize substantive enforceable intellectual property rules,
the climate must therefore be conducive to making the changes required. 132 This
means that intellectual property protection is one, among many, factors that play a
role. At a minimum, there must be some common economic, political, and social
goals that support the level of intellectual property protection mandated by these
trade agreements. Yet, trade-based intellectual property strategies have ignored this
reality and have failed to seek globally beneficial intellectual property laws.
While there are positive aspects to having strong intellectual property rights,
there may also be legitimate reasons for a particular nation to have minimal
intellectual property rights in furtherance of its national interest. 133 Unfortunately,
the current trend in international intellectual property is to attempt to minimize
diversity as much as possible. This strategy is counterproductive in the long term.
The next Part will outline how intellectual property-producing nations have
dominated norm setting in TRIPS and subsequent trade-related intellectual property
agreements in an attempt to counter, or avoid, value divergence.

knowledge for both economic and non-economic reasons. See J. Janewa OseiTutu, A Sui
Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge: The Cultural Divide in Intellectual Property
Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 147 (2011).
131. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,
GRTKF/IC/14/12 § 2, ¶ 20 (Aug. 26, 2009); World Intellectual Property Organization,
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, GRTKF/IC/9/INF/4, Annex II (Mar. 27, 2006) (outlining a
comparative summary of TCE sui generis legislation); Ghana Copyright Act of 2005, §§ 17,
44, 64 (providing perpetual protection for Ghanian folklore); New Zealand Trade Mark Act,
2002, § 17 (prohibiting the registration of marks that are likely to offend a segment of the
community, including the Maori); CODE CIVIL No. 27811 (2002) (Peru) (providing sui
generis protection for indigenous knowledge); Panama, Law No. 20 of 26 June 2000 on the
Special Intellectual Property Regime with Respect to the Collective Rights of Indigenous
Peoples to the Protection and Defense of their Cultural Identity and Traditional Knowledge,
WIPO (2000), www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3400.
132. Professor Yu refers to this as an “enabling environment.” Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A
TRIPS-PLUS ERA 173, 213–14 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle].
133. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 282 (observing that intellectual property
laws are tailored over time such that a country can achieve the appropriate balance between
producers and users of intellectual property protected goods).
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V. NORM SETTING BY THE NATIONS THAT PRODUCE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTED GOODS
This Part outlines the disparity between the goals of intellectual propertyproducing nations and intellectual property-consuming nations. In addition, this
portion of the Article discusses the trend towards increased protection through
TRIPS, bilateral agreements, and ACTA before turning to some examples of value
divergence in trade related intellectual property disputes.
A. The TRIPS Narrative
Various scholars have observed that the trend in international intellectual
property policy since TRIPS is toward increased intellectual property rights. 134 This
is due in part to the view held by some that, while TRIPS established minimum
standards, it did not go far enough. 135 Other scholars have challenged the validity
of TRIPS or have described it as being in a critical state. 136 Numerous
commentators have identified problems with TRIPS and the subsequent
developments in international intellectual property law, including the way TRIPS
was negotiated, its effect on different countries, and the likelihood that it works for
all nations or that it was intended to benefit all nations. 137 Further, in recognition of

134. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 286 (2004)
(“[S]erious questions arise as to the sustainability of the attempt in TRIPS to resolve the
international externality aspects of protecting new knowledge goods. An additional criticism
leveled at the emerging IPR system is that the agenda for increasing protection has been
articulated and pushed by rich-country governments effectively representing the commercial
interests of a limited set of industries that distribute knowledge goods.”).
135. Sherwood, supra note 17, at 40 (“The TRIPS Agreement was the result of a
compromise among sharply divided countries and does not reflect a robust level of
protection.”). Sherwood also suggests that rather than focusing on compliance issues, the
focus should be on the role of intellectual property as an incentive for innovation and
creativity. Id. at 40–42. He argues that developing countries will benefit from recognizing
the value of intellectual property and developing their intellectual property systems. Id. at 45.
136. See CORREA, supra note 60, at 3 (noting that developing countries received no
compensation for acquiescing to increased intellectual property protection); Harris, supra
note 26, at 691–93 (noting numerous reasons why TRIPS is a contract of adhesion); Peter K.
Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property and the Global Élites: An Introduction, 10 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2002) (noting the growing resentment over TRIPS is creating a
“legitimacy crisis within the international trading system”).
137. See, e.g., CORREA, supra note 60, at 3; CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND
TRADITIONAL MEDICINE (2006); Chon, supra note 105; Long, supra note 118, at 260–68;
SISULE F. MUSUNGU & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS
WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION (WIPO) 3 (2003), available
at http:// www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/WIPO(A4)final0304.pdf (noting that the
appropriateness of the standards contained in TRIPS for developing countries has been
seriously questioned, and that the TRIPS standards may be too high for these countries);
Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 29, at 839–42; Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 93;
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the needs of developing countries, particularly in relation to access to medicines,
commentators have been engaged in discourse about the need to maintain the
TRIPS flexibilities. 138 This is essential because it is unlikely that there will be
major revisions to TRIPS in the near future. However, the benefits of flexibility go
beyond accommodating developing countries. Flexibility can, in the long term, also
bolster American global intellectual property goals.
While the minimum intellectual property standards established by TRIPS were
welcomed in some quarters, 139 Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss observe that
TRIPS and the corresponding WTO jurisprudence protect producer interests while
little is done to protect user interests. 140 The reason for this outcome is that the
history surrounding the drafting and negotiation of TRIPS reflects a heavy
involvement and influence of intellectual property industries and intellectual
property associations. 141 Hence, the interests of the producers of intellectual
property goods were well accounted for in the Agreement. However, from the
perspective of the public, little was gained. For example, countries like India,
which for policy reasons did not previously provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, now have to do so. 142
Professor Correa, one of the scholars who has been critical of TRIPS from a
developing country perspective, characterizes the Agreement as creating standards
of intellectual property protection that suit industrialized countries. 143 He describes
the Agreement as part of a deliberate attempt to protect industrialized world
Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 933, 934 (2003); Yu,
Objectives, supra note 24.
138. See Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of
Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 508 (2005) (developing countries insist on the need to
maintain flexibility to implement economic and social development objectives);
Chakravarthi Raghavan, NGOs Demand “Pro-Public Health” Interpretation of TRIPS,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/pro.htm.
139. See CORREA, supra note 60, at 3 (explaining that industrialized countries, driven
largely by the United States, forced developing countries to adopt intellectual property
standards that were consistent with those that had been implemented in industrialized
countries).
140. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 72, at 449 (suggesting that TRIPS gives strict
international scrutiny to legislation that impinges upon producer interest while allowing
domestic legislatures the freedom to create legislation that affects user interests. This results
in intellectual property laws that favor intellectual property rights holders.).
141. Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, The WTO Dispute Settlement System and the
Evolution of International IP Law: An Institutional Perspective, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS 106, 119
(Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds., 2011) (citing SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC
LAW: THE GLOBALISATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003) and Andréa Koury
Menescal, Those Behind the TRIPS Agreement: The Influence of the ICC and the AIPPI on
International Intellectual Property Decisions, 2005 INTELL. PROP. Q. 155 on the involvement
of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Association for the Protection of Industrial
Property, and others in negotiating and drafting TRIPS).
142. Kapczynski, supra note 23, at 1576–78 (discussing India’s prohibition on patented
medicine prior to TRIPS).
143. CORREA, supra note 60 at 5 (arguing that most developing countries would have
shared the objective of combating piracy but that TRIPS goes beyond that because it is based
on a policy of “technological protectionism”).
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technology and to ensure that industrialized countries continue to produce
innovations while industrializing countries serve as markets for these innovative
goods. 144 This might seem like an excessively cynical view of the TRIPS
negotiations. However, Professor Leaffer’s scholarship, arguing in favor of the
merger between trade and intellectual property, also supports this understanding of
TRIPS. 145
The situation Professor Leaffer describes more accurately represents a desire to
protect the Western competitive advantage, as Professor Correa points out, rather
than a desire to reduce barriers to trade. Although TRIPS provided for a delayed
implementation period for developing and least-developed countries, 146 the grace
periods of five 147 and ten 148 years that were given to the developing and leastdeveloped countries were inadequate. Another challenge, from a practical
perspective, is that there are social and economic costs in monitoring and enforcing
intellectual property rights. 149
Further, while the intellectual property standards in TRIPS may, arguably,
support innovation in certain instances, 150 they may also create obstacles to
innovation. 151 Professors Chon and Long, for example, point out the focus on trade
utilitarianism 152 and its negative impact on developing nations, 153 while Professor

144. Id. (discussing the role of the United States in initiating the process of moving
intellectual property standards into the GATT Uruguay Round Negotiations).
145. See Leaffer, supra note 21, at 298. Professor Leaffer explains that intellectual
property became “a trade issue as the economies of the United States and other Western
countries have become dependent on selling information. As transfer of technology becomes
increasingly internationalized . . . Western countries, and particularly the United States, need
a vast international market to recover their costs.” Id.
146. TRIPS, supra note 15, arts. 65, 66.
147. Id. art. 65.2.
148. Id. art. 66.1.
149. MICHAEL PERELMAN, STEAL THIS IDEA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
CORPORATE CONFISCATION OF CREATIVITY 193 (2002) (discussing the costs of maintaining a
patent office, and referring to a study that estimated the 1978 cost of running the U.S. Patent
Office to be approximately $90 million and the cost of running the system, including the role
of the private sector, to be approximately $330 million in 1978); Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld,
supra note 30, at 302 (suggesting that that TRIPS could have a significantly different impact
on developing countries than the other WTO agreements. In particular, the cost of setting up
copyright, trademark, and patenting offices, as well as the costs involved in monitoring and
enforcing intellectual property rights is significant.).
150. See TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 7 (objective of TRIPS is to promote innovation);
Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the
Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 363, 372–79 (2000) (arguing that stronger intellectual property rights
promote innovation and economic development).
151. See, e.g., PERELMAN, supra note 149, at 3, 106–14 (arguing that the current system
of intellectual property rights is wasteful, stifles the dissemination of information, and blocks
scientific and economic progress. Perelman also points out that copyright protection offers
little incentive to creative artists but rather rewards the movie studios and music distribution
companies.).
152. See Chon, supra note 105, at 805–07; Long, supra note 118, at 243 (“Whether or not
intellectual property laws may be justified under theories of natural law, labor, or
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Okediji notes the apparent flexibility to incorporate higher intellectual property
standards and the corresponding insistence on inflexible minimum standards. 154
This scholarship details the lack of common intellectual property interests between
developing and developed countries. 155 The existence of such divergent interests
militates against intellectual property agreements and WTO decisions 156 that fail to
adequately acknowledge distinct societal development goals.
B. Bilateral Trade Agreements
It is clear from TRIPS, and from the subsequent developments in this field, that
the trend in global intellectual property law is towards increased intellectual
property protection. There has been a proliferation of regional and bilateral
agreements that strengthen intellectual property protection. 157 Intellectual property
producers, like the United States, and the European Union and its member states,
continued to negotiate agreements to increase intellectual property rights postTRIPS.
The United States, for example, has concluded bilateral trade agreements with a
number of countries, including Australia, Morocco, Korea, Singapore, Jordan,
Israel, Guatemala, Peru, and others. 158 These bilateral trade agreements have
chapters on the protection of intellectual property rights. The Dominican Republic
Central America Free Trade Agreement or “CAFTA” (agreement between the
United States, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Honduras), for example, requires the signatories to become parties

personality, TRIPS establishes only one international philosophy for their protection—
utiliarianism, or more precisely trade utilitarianism.” (emphasis in original)).
153. Chon, supra note 105, at 811 (“[D]istributional policy choices will appear
disproportionately to affect states with smaller markets, less international negotiating power,
smaller budgets for public research, and poorer and less empowered consumers.”); Long,
supra note 118, at 266–67.
154. See Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet
Treaties, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2379, 2400–03 (2009) [hereinafter Okediji, Regulation of
Creativity].
155. See, e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 9 (2008) (observing that intellectual property rights generally result in
increased prices and a reduced access to knowledge); Chon, supra note 105; Helfer, supra
note 12, at 974; Reichman, supra note 12, at 450–51.
156. These decisions can be dispute resolution panel decisions or decisions of the WTO
member states—including the work of the TRIPS Council. For instance, in response to a
request from the least developed country members, the TRIPS Council extended the delayed
implementation period to July 1, 2013. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005: Extension of the
Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov.
30, 2005) [Decision of Council for TRIPS].
157. James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 WASH.
L. REV. 421, 427 (2011); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in
International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 129 (2004).
158. Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements.
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to the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 159 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 160
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 161 and other international intellectual property
agreements that were not incorporated into TRIPS. 162
Moreover, many of these agreements require the signatories to adopt American
intellectual property standards that are higher than those required by the
international treaties. 163 For instance, Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
requires the parties to provide effective legal remedies to prevent the circumvention
of digital locks. 164 The United States implemented the WIPO Copyright Treaty
through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 165 Section 1201(a)(1)(A)
of the DMCA prohibits the circumvention of technological measures that control
access to the protected work, 166 while section 1201(a)(2) prohibits, among other
things, manufacturing, importing, providing, or trafficking in any technology,
product, service, or device that is designed to circumvent a technological
measure. 167 This goes beyond what the WIPO Copyright Treaty requires. 168

159. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
160. World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
161. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28.7 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733.
162. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement ch.
15, art. 15, para. 1, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text.
163. See Chander, Exporting DMCA, supra note 111, at 217.
164. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 159, at 71. Article 11 requires parties to
“provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of
their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.” Id.
165. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2861 (1998)
[hereinafter DMCA] (amending the United States Copyright Act, Title 17 of the U.S. Code).
166. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. The prohibition contained in
the preceding sentence shall take effect at the end of the 2-year period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this chapter.”).
167. Id. § 1201(a)(2) (“No person shall manufacture, import, . . . or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, [or] service . . . that . . . (A) is primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title; (B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with
that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
168. See Michael Geist, The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the WIPO Internet
Treaties: An Examination of the Anti-Circumvention Requirements, in FROM “RADICAL
EXTREMISM” TO “BALANCED COPYRIGHT”: CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA,
204, 207, 245–46 (Michael Geist ed., 2010).
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Despite the domestic critique of the DMCA, it is effectively being exported to
other countries through bilateral trade agreements. 169 The bilateral trade agreements
that the United States has negotiated since the enactment of the DMCA contain
provisions that require DMCA-style, anti-circumvention measures. 170 Moreover, it
has been suggested that the position promoted by the United States internationally
is not in line with American social and cultural considerations, particularly the
limitations on intellectual property rights that are respected domestically. 171
Bilateral trade agreements enable intellectual property-producing nations to
negotiate higher intellectual property standards. Hence, they further advance the
pro-intellectual property rights agenda within the context of international trade.
C. Plurilateral Trade Agreements
The most recent plurilateral “trade-related” intellectual property agreement is
the ACTA, which mandates increased intellectual property enforcement
standards. 172 The TPP is currently being negotiated and has an intellectual property
chapter that provides for higher intellectual property standards than TRIPS.
Scholars and non-governmental organizations have raised the alarm about the
recently concluded ACTA text and the trend towards increased intellectual property
rights. 173 These negotiations were part of a regime-shifting strategy that excluded
the majority of the world’s nations. ACTA, which was negotiated by a handful of

169. See Chander, Exporting DMCA, supra note 111, at 205–06 (expressing concern that
“we may be exporting our all-too-narrow vision of intellectual property to many of our
trading partners”); see also id. at 208 (discussing the anti-competitive effect of the DMCA,
observing that “[g]arage door openers and printer cartridges were certainly far from the
minds of lawmakers when they passed the DMCA in 1998. Yet, in an environment in which
silicone chips are embedded in more and more of our most ordinary products, potentially
copyrightable material can be found in the most unexpected places. This makes it possible to
invoke the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions in a wide variety of areas—including
printer cartridges, garage door openers, and video game multiplayer interfaces . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); see generally Andrew Christie, Sophie Waller & Kimberlee Weatherall,
Exporting the DMCA Through Free Trade Agreements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 211, 211–43 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders
eds., 2007).
170. Chander, Exporting DMCA, supra note 111, at 212.
Each of these mandates lengthy anti-circumvention requirements, permitting
exemptions to the anti-circumvention rule roughly as narrow as those in the
DMCA. In other words, there is no hint of concerns for the possible anticompetitive effects of the DMCA. The only exception is the draft of the
. . . Free Trade Area of the Americas, which permits each country to specify its
own exemptions.
Id.
171. See id. at 207 (noting that “the DMCA might not have adequately accounted for the
concerns of the neighboring legal subdiscipline of competition”).
172. See ACTA, supra note 18.
173. See Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, Text of Urgent ACTA
UNIV.
WASH.
COLL.
OF
LAW
(June
23,
2010),
Communique,
AM.
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique.
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partners—the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia, the European Union,
Japan, Morocco, South Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore—generated
controversy over the secrecy of negotiations and things like border measures. 174
ACTA allows nations to accede to the agreement following its conclusion by the
select group of nations that were invited to participate in the initial sessions. 175
The ACTA can be described as “TRIPS-plus” not because it changes the scope,
length, or nature of any intellectual property right but in the sense that it increases
the standards that have been set for the enforcement of those rights. 176 For example,
it incorporates some of the WIPO Copyright Treaty digital protection standards,
which are not part of TRIPS and not subject to any enforcement mechanism. 177
ACTA also encourages governments to cooperate with the business community in
protecting intellectual property rights. 178
Although ACTA has not been well received, it is not unusual for trade
agreements to generate resistance. 179 On the other hand, the hostility to ACTA may
be indicative of a growing recognition on the part of citizens of an increasing loss
of input into, and control over, the national intellectual property policies that affect
their lives and represent their shared values. 180 If trade-related intellectual property
agreements, such as ACTA and TRIPS, are viewed as having been negotiated

174. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., The Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative Releases Statement of ACTA Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTNA
Negotiations, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/office-ustrade-representative-releases-statement-ac (“Participants in the negotiations included
Australia, Canada, the European Union, represented by the European Commission, the EU
Presidency (Spain) and EU Member States, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore, Switzerland and the United States of America.”). For a critique of ACTA, see
Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, Preliminary Analysis of the ACTA
UNIV.
WASH.
COLL.
OF
LAW,
(Apr. 21,
2010),
Text,
AM.
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/statement-of-pijip-assoc-dir-sean-flynn-onthe-release-of-the-acta-negotiating-text.
175. ACTA, supra note 18, art. 39 n.17, identifies the following parties as being among
the limited participants in the ACTA negotiations: Australia, the Republic of Austria,
Canada, the European Union and its member states, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the
Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation, and the United
States of America.
176. See ACTA, supra note 18, arts. 6–10, 12, 23, 25–27.
177. Id. art. 27, para. 5, art. 27, para. 6, art. 27, para. 7. Compare with art. 11 of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 159.
178. ACTA, supra note 18, art. 27, para. 3.
179. For instance, there was controversy generated by the North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA]. There were large protests when the WTO met in Seattle, Washington in 1999. See
In Pictures: The WTO Seattle Protests, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 1999, 11:20 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/544786.stm; University Libraries, WTO Seattle
Collection, UNIV. OF WASH., http://content.lib.washington.edu/wtoweb/.
180. This can become a question of democratic input, which is not my purpose here. In
this Article, I do not seek to analyze whether or not citizens of a particular nation have their
views adequately represented in international negotiations. Instead, for the purposes of the
Article, I assume that governments that take a particular stance on high intellectual property
standards are representing their citizens in doing so.
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unfairly, and as reflecting the interests only of certain countries, there is a high risk
that these agreements will be perceived as irrelevant and even illegitimate. 181
Indeed, the legitimacy of the TRIPS Agreement has been called into question, as
has its validity for all nations, particularly when there is little regard for their
unique circumstances. 182 The question of legitimacy is significant for the United
States because, as sovereign states, nations may sign onto intellectual property
agreements, even those that are not in their favor, and then simply choose not to
comply. 183 If nation-states and individual citizens of these states see that the
national intellectual property laws, which implement their international obligations,
reflect their national values, they are more likely to see the laws as relevant to their
circumstances. In the long term, the sense of ownership that arises from genuine
input into the shaping of suitable international and domestic intellectual property
rules will lead to a more robust regime.
The numerous reasons why states comply with international law are complex
and go beyond the scope of this Article. 184 However, it seems fairly obvious that if
an agreement is neither socially nor economically beneficial to a given nation, its
implementation and compliance will prove to be challenging. Nonetheless,
compared to a plurilateral agreement like ACTA, the WTO, despite its flaws, offers
more advantages.
D. Why the WTO Is Still a Relevant and Better Alternative
One might take the position that with the increasing number of bilateral
agreements, TRIPS is becoming irrelevant. However, TRIPS remains the only
multilateral, trade-related intellectual property agreement, and it is significant for
this reason. Further, decisions handed down by WTO panels have legal
implications for the parties to the case and are not technically binding on other

181. See Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past or a
Small Step Forward?, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 196–206 (arguing that TRIPS could be
considered a treaty of adhesion because there was an inequality of bargaining power and
oppressive economic coercion).
182. See CORREA, supra note 60; Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The
Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7
J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 304–05 n.107 (2004) (“Increasingly broad and vocal consortiums
of . . . NGOs . . . are challenging the ‘moral, political and economic legitimacy’ of TRIPS,
focusing on provisions of the treaty that affect public health, human rights, biodiversity, and
plant genetic resources.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Laurence R. Helfer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting])).
183. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 497–507 (2005) (suggesting that states may sign
on for a variety of reasons even if they have no intention of complying with a treaty. Some
of the reasons for doing so include the fact that it can be difficult to get information about
state practice or that ratification may be a sufficient signal to satisfy transnational actors
(such as multinational corporations) who want to see a change in the law.).
184. I refer here to international law as including international treaties, customary
international law, and soft law norms. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Hathaway, supra note 183.
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WTO panels, but they do provide a standard which guides the WTO members in
their understanding of their obligations. 185 In this way, the prescriptive impact of
WTO dispute resolution panels, and decisions or statements by member states, such
as the Doha Declaration, is much broader and more significant than the application
of a particular bilateral treaty. It is also possible that WTO interpretations of
intellectual property obligations will influence the understanding of intellectual
property rights in the context of trade-related bilateral and plurilateral agreements.
1. The Advantage of the WTO for Developing Countries
In international law and politics, there is, arguably, rule by the most powerful
nations. 186 In this sense, the economically and politically powerful nations
effectively dominate with the force of a majority even if they are numerically a
minority in the global context. 187 Norm setting is therefore controlled by these
dominant actors. Acknowledging the views of economically weaker states enables
all parties to be treated as equals, whether or not they are, in fact, economically and
politically powerful. In international trading relations, this may, as in domestic law,
help to create a global system that more closely reflects the interests of all nations.
It allows the countries with less political and economic influence to have the
flexibility they need to implement policies that will allow them to strengthen their
societies. 188
However, the clear trend in trade-based intellectual property norm setting is to
sidestep intellectual property value differences through the use of trade regimes.
The ACTA, for instance, is a recent example of the “regime shifting” that Professor
Helfer describes as a strategy nations use to achieve results that are more difficult
to attain in a multilateral setting. 189 This was a way to avoid having to agree on
intellectual property law and policy. Instead, the language of trade was used, and,
in the case of the ACTA, a handful of relatively like-minded nations reached an
agreement to which others could later accede. Alternatively, a single country, or
group of similarly situated countries, often less influential nations, may find
themselves negotiating intellectual property clauses in trade agreements with
powerful entities like the United States or the European Union.

185. See DSU, supra note 56, at art. 3, para. 2
186. See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100
AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 72–75 (2006) (detailing international relations realist theory about the
coercive power of states in making international law).
187. Cf. Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119,
162–63 (2003) (explaining that minority status among shareholders is based on some indicia
of control as well as the power relations within a corporation). In the global context, the
majority of nations end up with a minority-like status in trade negotiations. This is due to
their weaker economies and their corresponding dependence on wealthy nations for financial
support and access to markets.
188. Cf. id. at 171–72 (arguing that protecting minorities may help end the trap of
poverty in which many minority families tend to find themselves, thereby, allowing them to
become more economically productive).
189. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 182, at 6.
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Unfortunately, regime shifting can exacerbate power imbalances, which can
make it more difficult to achieve agreements that are globally acceptable. With
respect to legitimacy, plurilateral agreements like the ACTA risk a worse fate than
TRIPS because it was negotiated by a handful of nations rather than in the
multilateral WTO setting. Yet, trade-based intellectual property agreements are
already hampered by their perceived lack of validity and relevance for many
nations.
The appeal of TRIPS, therefore, is that it provides a more inclusive multilateral
framework. Even for the less powerful countries, the WTO framework offers
advantages over bilateral or plurilateral arrangements. Hence, it is worth expending
the effort to refine the interpretation and application of TRIPS rather than finding
ways to dismantle the agreement in response to the pro-rights nature of the WTO
decisions and the general trend in global intellectual property law. This prointellectual property trend is reversible. As the next Part argues, the problem is not
as much in TRIPS as it is in the interpretation and application of the Agreement.
Due to the multilateral nature, WTO decisions have a potentially greater impact
than bilateral and plurilateral agreements. TRIPS remains relevant, therefore,
because the WTO is well situated to set the tone with respect to the global
understanding of trade-related intellectual property rights.
VI. TRIPS DISPUTES AND VALUE DIVERGENCE
This Part of the Article contemplates two WTO disputes: one involving an
emerging superpower, China, and another involving a Western industrialized
country, Canada, to illustrate the relevance of values.
In line with its commitment to “aggressively protect American intellectual
property overseas,” 190 the United States compiles an annual list of countries that
fail to meet American standards for intellectual property protection. 191 A country
may be identified by the United States as failing to adequately protect intellectual
property rights even if it is compliant with its international obligations. 192 Several
countries made it on the recent United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special
301 Priority Watch List, including China and Canada. 193
The recent tensions between the United States and China, or the United States
and Canada, may be part of the normal growing pains associated with relatively

190. 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 5.
191. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (2006).
192. The Trade Act of 1974 provides that an unreasonable policy or practice can include
the failure to provide adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights
“notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific
obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.” Id.
§ 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II).
193. 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 19, 25. Canada and China, America’s two largest
trading partners, remain on the 2011 USTR Special 301 Priority Watch List. See Press
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Releases Annual Special 301 Report on
Intellectual
Property
Rights,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2011/may/ustr-releases-annual-special-301-report-intellectual-p.
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new harmonized intellectual property standards. 194 However, they can also be
explained as a failure to acknowledge value divergence in global intellectual
property law and policy. For instance, the government of the United States is aware
that copyright piracy is not necessarily a priority for the government of China but
nonetheless continues to pressure China to make it a priority. 195
A. The WTO China Copyright Dispute as an Example of Value Differences
Since the conclusion and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO panels
and trade negotiators are able to influence the calibration of the national intellectual
property balance. 196
In a recent dispute between China and the United States, 197 the United States
took issue with alleged widespread copyright infringement in China. 198 In the
complaint, the United States argued that Chinese law was not TRIPS compliant
because it allowed authorities to dispose of infringing goods outside of commercial
channels with destruction as a last resort, did not offer copyright protection to
works that were contrary to Chinese censorship laws, and imposed criminal
penalties for piracy on a commercial scale—the threshold for which the United
States considered too high. 199 The United States asserted that Chinese law was
inconsistent with China’s obligations under Articles 9, 41, 200 46, 59, and 61 201 of

194. As part of the Marrakesh agreements, TRIPS came into force on January 1, 1995.
See Article 3, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 2 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994).
195. See 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 20.
The United States notes that at times particular enforcement actions are directed
not only at copyright or trademark infringement, but also include infringement
activities that may be considered more serious under the Chinese legal system.
There is a concern that such actions lead to the public perception that the
enforcement authorities are not focused on enforcing intellectual property
specifically. This perception can be reinforced when effective enforcement
measures are not taken against well-known infringers. The United States urges
the Chinese government to demonstrate consistent resolve when fighting piracy
and counterfeiting . . . by taking firm action against such infringers, so that they
will adjust their business models to respect intellectual property laws, and
thereby send a strong signal throughout the country.
Id.
196. See Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who
Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 459, 467–68 (2004) (discussing the choices WTO panels face in balancing
competing policy goals).
197. China-U.S. Panel Report, supra note 69.
198. See 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 19 (“The U.S. copyright industries report severe
losses due to piracy in China.”).
199. China-U.S. Panel Report, supra note 69, at 2–3, 4–5.
200. The relevant language reads as follows:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of
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the TRIPS Agreement. China responded, in essence, that its laws were TRIPS
compliant and that the panel should reject the American interpretation of Chinese
law and TRIPS obligations. 202
The panel concluded that denying copyright protection for censored works was
inconsistent with the Berne Convention, Article 5, paragraph (1) 203 obligation as
incorporated into TRIPS Article 9, paragraph 1. 204 The United States was also
successful in its argument that removing the infringing trademark from a good was
insufficient and that it was inconsistent with China’s obligations under Articles 59
and 46 of TRIPS. 205 However, the panel accepted the use of donations and auctions
as acceptable disposal of the goods. 206 On the important question of criminal
thresholds for piracy, the panel concluded that the United States had failed to meet
its evidentiary burden 207—essentially, the United States made allegations of
commercial scale infringement but did not provide sufficient evidence to support its
claims.
This case may signal the inadequacy of the TRIPS enforcement provisions.
However, another interpretation is that, despite having acceded to the WTO in
2001, the most suitable copyright policy for China at this time may be substantially

infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which
constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be
applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 41, para. 1.
201. The relevant language reads as follows:
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at
least in cases of wilful [sic] trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a
commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of
penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases,
remedies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of
the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the predominant use
of which has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide for
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other [c]ases of infringement
of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully
[sic] and on a commercial scale.
Id. art. 61.
202. See China-U.S. Panel Report, supra note 69.
203. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this
Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the
rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their
nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.
Id. art. 5, para. (1).
204. China-U.S. Panel Report, supra note 69, at 39, 134.
205. Id. at 69–71, 134.
206. Id. at 69, 72–74, 78–79, 85.
207. Id. at 125, 132, 133.
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different from the most suitable copyright policy for the United States. 208 In
seeking areas of intellectual property policy commonality, it might be more fruitful
to seek to understand why copyright enforcement is not a priority for China rather
than pressuring China to change its priorities.
For instance, the historical approach to property and intellectual property rights
taken by some Asian cultures was markedly different from that of the United
States. The classic example is that of copyright in China. In his seminal work, To
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense, Professor Alford explains that in China, not
only was copying acceptable, it was considered a compliment. 209 He argues that
attempts to introduce Western intellectual property law into China have been
relatively unsuccessful because of the failure to consider the relevance of Western
models of intellectual property protection for China. 210 Because knowledge of the
past functioned as an instrument for moral development and as a method for
measuring relationships, it was considered crucial for the Chinese to have broad
access to such knowledge. Therefore, the role of the past was inconsistent with the
concept of the fruits of intellectual efforts as private property. 211
Japan, although its current intellectual property laws and practice are largely in
line with the United States, provides another example of an Asian society that took
a distinct approach to culture and copyright. 212 Japan enacted its first modern
copyright legislation in 1899 following international pressure arising from treaty
obligations with Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Germany, France, and the
Netherlands. 213 Professor Scott characterizes Japan as a collectivist society and
describes the Japanese approach to copyright as being culturally distanced from the
economic approach of the United States. 214 For example, the definition of cultural
property includes intellectual property, and copyrighted works are considered
cultural assets. 215 Also, Japanese copyright law is more heavily influenced by the
German and French traditions and therefore treats authors’ economic rights as
distinct from moral rights. 216

208. As discussed, this case involved questions of censorship and criminal enforcement.
However, I focus on copyright, as this was the primary intellectual property issue in this
dispute.
209. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 27–29 (1995) (explaining that in Chinese culture it
was acceptable to reproduce or imitate the works of highly regarded artists from the past as
part of one’s own artistic work). For a contrary view, see Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property
and Asian Values 7–8 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at
7–8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945104.
210. ALFORD, supra note 209, at 2.
211. Id. at 18–20.
212. See Scott, Cultural Property, supra note 107, at 302, 308 (explaining that Japan had
a strong caste and class system but that one could change classes, so there was no revolution
as there was in Europe).
213. Id. at 330, 331 (explaining that there was a nascent intellectual property system in
Japan by the beginning of the Tokugawa period, which was from 1603 to 1867).
214. Id. at 300, 318.
215. Id. at 316, 318.
216. Id. at 339.
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There are some obvious differences between developed countries and emerging
economies such as China or India or culturally distinct nations, like Japan. But
nations that share more cultural and economic similarities also differ on their views
about the appropriate intellectual property balance, as shaped by their national
values.
B. The WTO Canada Patent Pharmaceuticals Dispute as an Example of Value
Differences
Canada, the European Union, and the United States work closely together on
various matters and are among a handful of parties that negotiated the ACTA. Yet
they continue to have differences over intellectual property rights. Indeed, many of
the TRIPS disputes that led to the establishment of WTO panels were between
developed countries, including the EU and the United States. 217 In other words,
even countries 218 that are relatively similarly situated may have value differences
that generate tension.
Canada and the United States are both New World English speaking nations,
with legal systems that are based on the British common law system. These two
countries are neighbors, allies, and partners in the North American Free Trade
Agreement. 219 They share many more similarities than differences. Both the
Canadian and the American patent and copyright laws are consistent with their
current international obligations. 220 Yet, these two nations have fundamental value
differences that shape their perceptions of the intellectual property balance. Hence,
Canada is on the USTR Special 301 Watch List as one of the most egregious
violators of intellectual property rights. 221 The Special 301 Report is compiled
annually by the USTR to identify countries that, in the view of the United States

217. See
Disputes
by
Agreement,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26#select
ed_agreement. Panels were established for DS50 (United States-India), DS59 (United StatesIndonesia), DS79 (European Union-India), DS114 (European Union-Canada), DS160
(European Union-United States), DS170 (United States-Canada), DS174 (United StatesEuropean Union), DS176 (European Union-United States), DS290 (Australia-European
Union), and DS362 (United States-China). Id.
218. The EU (formerly the European Community and its member states) participates in
WTO disputes. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to “countries” even though this term is
properly applied to the EU member states but not the EU itself.
219. NAFTA, supra note 179.
220. Note that while Canada has signed the WIPO Internet Treaties, it has not ratified
them. See Treaties and Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (Nov. 22, 2011).
This means that Canada has agreed in principle to the treaties, but it is not obligated to
implement the treaties into its domestic law until it has ratified them.
221. 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 11, 25. The United States wants Canada to implement
the WIPO 1996 Internet Treaties, identifying internet piracy as a problem in Canada. Id. In
addition, the USTR criticizes what it considers to be Canada’s weak border enforcement
because border agents do not have the authority to seize allegedly infringing goods without a
court order. Id.
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government, provide inadequate intellectual property protection. 222 The test for the
USTR is whether the level of protection is satisfactory to the United States. 223
One of the early WTO intellectual property disputes was between the European
Union and Canada, with the United States and other countries joined as third
parties. 224 The case involved a question of pharmaceutical protection and what
constitutes a limited exception to the patent right. Canadian legislation permitted
generic manufacturing companies to engage in research for the purposes of meeting
regulatory requirements (the “regulatory review exemption”). 225 The legislation
also allowed companies to manufacture the patented drug six months before the
expiry of the patent so that the generic version of the drug would be ready to go on
the market once the patent expired (the “stockpiling exemption”). 226 Brazil, India,
Cuba, and Israel agreed with Canada, 227 while the United States 228 and Japan 229
agreed in part but argued against stockpiling. The panel preferred the position put
forth by the United States and Japan. 230
Article 30 of TRIPS allows for limited exceptions to the patent right, provided
that the exception does not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of
the patent or prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner. 231 However, the
legitimate interests of third parties must also be considered. 232
Canada argued that the limited exceptions to the right conferred, taking into
account the legitimate interests of third parties, should be read in light of Articles 7
and 8 of TRIPS. 233 Article 7 of the Agreement recognizes the need to balance
interests in a manner that is conducive to social welfare. 234 Article 8 of TRIPS
allows nation states to take measures to protect public health, provided the
measures are consistent with the Agreement. 235 The Canadian position was that the

222. The report also identified inadequate protection as a problem in Brazil, China,
India, Italy, Russia, Spain, and the Ukraine. Id. at 11.
223. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). This explains why nations
may comply with their international obligations and still find themselves on the USTR
Special 301 Watch List.
224. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Panel Report].
225. Id. at 2.
226. Id. at 2–3.
227. Id. at 106, 111, 119–21.
228. Id. at 138.
229. Id. at 123.
230. Id. at 156, 162, 169, 174.
231. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 30.
232. Id. Article 30 states: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” Id.
233. Canada Panel Report, supra note 224, at 25.
234. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 7.
235. Id. art. 8, para. 1. Article 8, paragraph 1 states: “Members may, in formulating or
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
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interest of ensuring access to low-cost drugs as soon as the patent expired was both
legitimate and important. 236 As such, Canada argued, TRIPS requires balance, and
intellectual property rights should not be allowed to override “social and economic
welfare, and the rights of others.” 237
The United States submitted that the regulatory review exemption was
acceptable. 238 The American position was that while Articles 7 and 8 gave insight
into the objectives and purposes of TRIPS, neither of these provisions “diminished
the substantive obligations of the Agreement.” 239 The United States took the
position that the stockpiling exception was not justified as a limited exception. 240
While disagreeing that stockpiling shortened the patent term, 241 the United States
submitted that the stockpiling exception would unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder. The question, from the U.S. perspective, was
whether the limitation interfered with the economic benefits that a patent holder
would normally enjoy during the patent period. 242 The United States argued that the
stockpiling exception was not necessary to facilitate the immediate entry into the
market of generic drugs.
Although the panel acknowledged that Articles 7 and Article 8 must be kept in
mind when analyzing the limited exceptions under Article 30, 243 it does not appear
that the panel gave much weight to these provisions or to the Canadian arguments
that were based on these balancing provisions of TRIPS. The panel considered
“limited exceptions” and concluded, looking at the dictionary definitions of
“limited,” 244 that the exception must be minor, insignificant, or restricted. 245 The
exception must be measured by “the extent to which the exclusive rights of the
patent owner have been curtailed.” 246 In particular, according to the panel, Article
30 requires the economic impact of the exception to be considered. 247 With respect
to the stockpiling, the panel concluded that, in the absence of limitations on the
quantity of production, allowing manufacturing of the patented product during the
last six months of the patent term abrogated the rights of the patent holder during
that time. 248
Interestingly, the panel’s analysis did not reflect a consideration of the broader
societal interests that were advanced or the fact that there would be no commercial
implications until after the patent had expired. Rather, the panel seemed to hold the
view that commercial benefits that may have existed after the expiration of the

economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement.” Id.
236. Canada Panel Report, supra note 224, at 27.
237. Id. at 25, 27.
238. Id. at 138–42, ¶¶ 5.34, 5.36.
239. Id. at 139, ¶ 5.36.
240. Id. at 142.
241. Id. at 143.
242. Id. at 141.
243. Id. at 154, ¶ 7.26.
244. Id. ¶¶ 7.27–7.28.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 155, ¶ 7.31.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 156, ¶ 7.36.
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patent term were part of the normal part of the patent owner’s right to exclude
others from making and using the patented good during the patent term. 249 The
panel also found the six-month period to be a commercially significant period of
time over the course of a twenty-year patent term. 250 Not only was the societal
priority on a public health care system that requires access to low-cost drugs not
given due consideration but also the period of market exclusivity granted by a
patent was deemed to extend beyond the expiry of the patent term. This was
considered an integral part of the commercial gain to which the patent holder
should be entitled.
Thus, the panel focused on the economic interests of the patent holder. 251 Yet,
Article 7 of TRIPS speaks to the role of intellectual property in contributing to
social welfare and speaks to a “balance of rights and obligations.” 252 The Canadian
calibration of this balance may be based on Canada placing relatively equal
importance on the value of public health and the interests of society in having
access to low-cost medications and the ability of the patent holder to delay the
market entry of the generic product. 253 In this instance, the dissemination of
technology in a manner conducive to social welfare may have been the prevailing
factor for Canada in assessing the role of patents and the interests of the patent
holder, vis-à-vis the interests of the consuming public.
We are asked to take as a given, without justification, that the economic interests
of the patent holder should be prioritized over the other interests at stake. 254 The
assumption is that the economic interests of the patent holder spur his or her
innovation and that without sufficient incentive there will be a lack of innovation.
However, it is not clear that innovation is necessarily driven by economic

249. In the Canada Panel Report, the Panel writes:
In view of Canada’s emphasis on preserving commercial benefits before the
expiration of the patent, the Panel also considered whether the market
advantage gained by the patent owner in the months after the expiration of the
patent could also be considered a purpose of the patent owner’s right to exclude
“making” and “using” during the term of the patent. In both theory and
practice, the Panel concluded that such additional market benefits were within
the purpose of these rights.
Id. at 156, ¶ 7.35 (emphasis in original).
250. Id. at 156–57.
251. See Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous
Precedent in Dangerous Times, J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493, 494 (2000).
252. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 7.
253. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533,
548 (Can.) (“Until 1993 the Minister of Health was not directly concerned with patent issues.
Indeed, Parliament’s policy since 1923 had been to favour health cost savings over the
protection of intellectual property by making available to generic manufacturers a scheme of
compulsory licensing of an ‘invention intended or capable of being used for medicine or for
the preparation or production of medicine’ under s. 39(4) of the Patent Act.”).
254. See Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 29, at 914–15 (noting that WTO dispute
panels have tended to focus on private economic interests, emphasizing the market interests
of intellectual property rights holders in determining whether a TRIPS violation has occurred
and “[f]urther, the cases suggest that the panels . . . have interpreted the provisions almost
solely in light of the economic expectations of the private right holders” (footnote omitted)).
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motivations. 255 Additionally, in this case, the patent holder was not deprived of his
economic rights. The exclusive right to make the product was curtailed by six
months, but the generic version would not be available for sale until after the
expiry of the patent. This is not simply a question of determining the appropriate
standard for assessing the balance that was built into TRIPS, vis-à-vis the rights of
the patent holder. Rather, it is a question of giving those balancing provisions any
weight whatsoever. 256 Ultimately, the panel’s analysis reads out the balance that
was written into Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. 257
What if the primary role of intellectual property law in a given nation is to
promote social welfare, health or culture? 258 What if the role of intellectual
property is valued differently in a particular instance, and the corporate economic
interests are not, therefore, prioritized? TRIPS, if it is to be relevant, must be
sufficiently malleable to suit all nations. The Agreement does not prohibit states
from prioritizing public interest concerns as part of the domestic calibration of the
intellectual property balance.
As Professor Okediji suggests, the imbalances resulting from the way in which
TRIPS was negotiated can be corrected in the enforcement phase by deferring to
state policy. 259 The tensions that arise at the intersection of intellectual property

255. Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV 130, 132, 166 (2009); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 27 (2010) (observing that
despite significant efforts, it is difficult to quantify the net effect of counterfeiting and piracy
on the economy); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century:
Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1116–18 (2009)
(discussing how various nations attained high levels of economic growth without having
strong intellectual property rights). But see Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Law as
Stimulus: The Role of Law in Fostering Innovative Entrepreneurship, 6 J. L. & POL’Y INFO.
SOC’Y 153, 166–68 (2010) (arguing that the patent system overall tends to benefit
entrepreneurs); Rod Falvey, Neil Foster & David Greenaway, Intellectual Property Rights
and Economic Growth 1, 7–9 (Internationalisation of Economic Policy Research Paper
Series,
Paper
no.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=715982 (showing a positive relationship
between intellectual property protection and economic growth).
256. See Howse, supra note 251, at 493.
257. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 7–8. With respect to the question of how a WTO panel
should interpret that balance, it should be done, like any other international agreement, in
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 and, like any other WTO dispute, on a case-by-case basis. See Okediji, Public
Welfare, supra note 29, at 915 (noting that WTO-TRIPS dispute cases incorrectly assume
that multiple levels of tension and policy differences were resolved during the TRIPS
negotiations and therefore presume that the domestic balance should be renegotiated in light
of the international obligations).
258. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property Under BITs, FTAs,
and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 4 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (noting that
various commentators have pointed out the impact of intellectual property rights on a range
of public interest matters like public health, education, and food security).
259. Okediji notes the following:
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rights and global public health, education, or the protection of cultural heritage,
reflect the recognition that the value in intellectual property rights is not just in the
economic benefits conferred to the right holder. The need to recognize values other
than the private economic interests of the rights holders have become increasingly
salient since the time of TRIPS was implemented. 260 This is true not only for
TRIPS, but also for bilateral and multilateral trade-related intellectual property
agreements.
VII. VALUING DIVERSITY
Minimum intellectual property standards can facilitate trade. This is because if
there is some guaranteed minimum level of protection, intellectual property goods
can cross borders more easily, and the rights holders can have some assurance that
their rights will be respected in various nations. However, advising countries that
increased intellectual property rights will be good for their social and economic
development does not make it so. 261 For instance, it has been observed that
attempts to increase standards through substantive harmonization efforts, such as
the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 262 were premature. 263 This is because a
number of countries are still struggling to adjust to the TRIPS standards and further
negotiations are likely to be detrimental to the countries that already find the TRIPS
standards too high. 264 Indeed, moving towards even greater harmonization by
The TRIPS negotiations best reflect an uncooperative game with a core that
subverted the competitive assumptions. This requires the existence of
mechanisms to correct imbalances that are attributed to the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement. This can be done in the area of TRIPS enforcement, by
deferring to state policy, to the extent that the policy seeks to preserve a balance
between owners and users, as well as owners and downstream innovators, in
efforts to promote public welfare. . . . In short, all countries should be
concerned about the domestic welfare balance in intellectual property policies
of other member states given the interdependence of the global economic
system. If the TRIPS Agreement is enforced with a maximalist brush, the
welfare goals of domestic intellectual property will be subverted, as will the
welfare goals intrinsic to the competitive trade model.
Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 29, at 861.
260. For instance, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
infra note 314, para. 17, adopted subsequent to this decision, acknowledges the importance
of health-related societal goals and values.
261. Okediji, Regulation of Creativity, supra note 154, at 2404–07 (noting that WIPO
makes claims to developing countries about the benefits of increased copyright protection,
but arguing that the WIPO internet treaties are of no apparent benefit).
262. World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), WIPO Doc. SCP/10/2 (Sept. 30,
2003).
263. Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 93, at 91–92 (suggesting that it is too soon after
TRIPS to attempt further harmonization and noting that developing countries are still
attempting to absorb the social costs of elevated patent standards created by TRIPS).
264. Id. at 92 (arguing that “the dynamics of TRIPS and the post-TRIPS trade agreements
teach that even a development-sensitive negotiation process is likely to produce an
instrument that furthers interests of developed countries at the expense of poorer, less
powerful participants”).
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focusing on the commodity 265 value of intellectual property goods creates two
problems that weaken the regime. 266
First, the trade orientation tends to overemphasize this narrow commodity view
of copyrighted and patented goods. Hence, it minimizes the ability of states to
prioritize values such as social and economic development, access to knowledge, or
the promotion of cultural heritage. 267 Assessing intellectual property outcomes in
relation to private economic gain also fails to recognize, for instance, that copyright
subsists even if the copyrighted work never becomes an article of commerce. The
value of the copyright may be that the author is acknowledged for her work and
that the integrity of the work is protected, rather than any market value that may
attach to the work. Copyrights and patents are not predicated on the sale or
commercialization of the protected good.
Second, utilizing this kind of strategic pressure could, quite reasonably, be
perceived as bullying tactics. Ultimately, the likelihood of success is decreased if
the pressured parties fail to buy into the system. Even if the national leaders are coopted through political pressure, the citizens may resist the standards or find
themselves unable to comply due to a lack of resources. Indeed, the more that the
intellectual property laws that states adopt are contrary to their interests, the greater
the likelihood of resistance and hostility to the changes. Assuming that states are
rational actors, they will act, where possible, in their own self-interest. 268
State resistance to agreements that work against their interests can take many
forms, both formal and informal. 269 Where there are overriding national objectives,

265. “Commodities” are defined as “those things, which are useful or serviceable,
particularly articles of merchandise moveable in trade. Goods, wares, and merchandise of
any kind; articles or trade or commerce.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (9th ed. 2009).
266. I speak here primarily of copyrights and patents. Trademarks, on the other hand, are
designed to be used in the course of trade.
267. See Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 97 (2007); OseiTutu, supra note 130.
268. Guzman, supra note 184, at 1841. Professor Guzman explains that the self-interest
can be identified based on the basis of public interest or public choice theory. Id. The former
assumes that governments act in the interest of their citizens while the latter assumes that
government decisions are shaped by pressure from interest groups and may not reflect the
national interest. Id. Because it is difficult to predict the outcome of interest group analysis,
it is difficult, Professor Guzman explains, to apply it to normative analysis. Id. For the
purposes of this Article, this writer assumes that states are rational actors and that they will
act in their self-interest, regardless of how that self-interest is determined.
269. Id. at 1853 (“A country’s decision to follow international law reflects a judgment
that the costs of a violation outweigh the benefits. Because the opportunities and risks facing
a country vary both over time and across contexts, however, a country may choose to follow
a particular law at one time or in one context and violate it at another time or in another
context.”); Sherwood, supra note 17, at 37 (noting that intellectual property systems require
a significant level of administrative and judicial discretion: “Unless those who operate those
systems hold a belief that they serve local interests, international rules, however derived or
enforced, are likely to achieve little. Put more precisely, there are probably a dozen ways a
patent office can defeat an inventor and as many more ways available to a judge . . . In other
words . . . international lawmaking has only a limited potential for forcing countries to do
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governments may even contemplate implementing national laws that conflict with
the intellectual property treaties. 270 On the other hand, if the state actor is politically
and economically powerful, it can negotiate its interests separately through bilateral
trade agreements, such as the various wine agreements in which the European
Union negotiated better protection for its geographical indications. 271 It seems
fairly apparent, however, that this is not the time to strengthen and further
harmonize intellectual property laws. A significant level of harmonization may be
challenging not only for developing countries, but for industrialized countries as
well.
Although there has not been interest convergence on intellectual property law
and policy, this does not mean that the international community should not strive to
find areas of interest convergence. It is essential to the success of TRIPS and global
intellectual property law to develop a globally beneficial intellectual property
system, even if this means allowing value divergence and encouraging nations to
tailor intellectual property laws to suit their specific needs. Not only would this be
consistent with TRIPS, it would further the long-term interests of both intellectual
property users and producers.
A. TRIPS Recognizes Value Diversity
It is precisely because there has not been a convergence of intellectual property
interests that adequate attention must be accorded to Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS.
The objectives of TRIPS, as set out in Article 7 of the Agreement, provide that
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of innovation and to
the transfer and dissemination of technology in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare. 272 Thus, while discussions of intellectual property often focus on
what they are unprepared to do.”); id. at 44 (“For an IP regime to work well, there must be a
belief in the country that the country’s interests are well served.”).
270. See Robert Block, Big Drug Firms Defend Right to Patents on AIDS Drugs in South
African Court, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2001, at A3; Gumisai Mutume, AIDS Activists March
Against
Pharmaceutical
Companies,
THIRD
WORLD
NETWORK,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/against.htm (noting that protests ensued after March 5, 2001
when “subsidiaries of about 40 major drug makers challenged a 1997 South African law that
permits the health minister to shop around for the lowest-priced patented products around the
world, under a practice termed parallel importing. The law also allows compulsory licensing,
giving the minister powers to permit local companies to manufacture generic versions of
patented drugs.”). Due to this pressure, the forty drug manufactures later dropped the suit in
2005. See Anna Lanoszka, Coalition of Pharmaceutical Producers Withdraws Lawsuit
Against
the South African
Government, GLOBALIZATION & AUTONOMY,
http://www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/glossary_entry.jsp?id=EV.0016.
271. Agreement Between Australia and the European Community on Trade in Wine,
Austl.-EU, Jan. 31, 1994, 1820 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1994).
272. Article 7 of TRIPS states the following:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 7.
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the goal of promoting innovation, the Agreement also recognizes the importance of
disseminating that technology as well as the need for intellectual property rights to
contribute not only to economic welfare but also to social welfare. Further, Article
8, paragraph 1 of TRIPS allows members to take measures that are necessary to
protect public health. 273 However, Article 8, paragraph 1 also requires the measures
to be “consistent” with the provisions of the agreement. 274 These provisions serve
as a safeguard. Even with this moderating language, many countries find the
intellectual property minimum standards to be higher than what would be useful for
their society, given their economic and social conditions.
Like other international agreements, TRIPS is to be interpreted in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of the words in their context and in light of the object
and purpose of the treaty. 275 The preamble of the Agreement, which forms part of
the context, 276 recognizes the various goals of TRIPS and acknowledges the
differing roles that intellectual property rights may play in different nations. The
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights is one of the goals
of TRIPS. 277 But the Agreement also recognizes that nations will have underlying
public policy objectives for the protection of intellectual property. 278
TRIPS recognizes that innovation is not the only role for intellectual property
rights but that nations may have developmental and technological objectives. 279 In
addition, TRIPS acknowledges the special needs of developing countries and states
that they should be given “maximum flexibility” in implementing their obligations
so that they can develop a sound technological base. 280 Recognizing that the

273. “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.” TRIPS,
supra note 15, art. 8, para.1.
274. Id.
275. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, para. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.”).
276. Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention states: “The context for the purpose of the
interpretation of the treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes. . . .” Id. art. 31, para. 2.
277. TRIPS, supra note 15, at 300 (“Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade”
(emphasis in original)).
278. Id. (“Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives.”
(emphasis in original)).
279. Id.
280. Id. (“Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed country Members in
respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” (emphasis in
original)).
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implementation of the TRIPS obligations would be challenging for developing
countries, the Agreement allowed developing countries and least-developed
countries additional four-year and ten-year grace periods, respectively. 281 These
statements of flexibility indicate an awareness that national objectives inform the
national determination of the appropriate role for intellectual property rights in a
given society.
The private nature of intellectual property rights is also explicitly recognized. 282
Indeed, these are state-granted private rights that are granted in exchange for some
public benefit. There is no clear reason why, interpreting TRIPS in its context in
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 283 private interests
should be prioritized over public interests. Indeed, the objectives of the Agreement
suggest otherwise. 284 Finally, in line with the objectives of the WTO and the longterm nature of these trading relationships, TRIPS emphasizes the importance of
reducing tensions by resolving disputes through multilateral procedures. 285
However, if the Agreement is consistently interpreted to favor rights holders, it
may have the reverse effect and exacerbate tensions over time.
The apparent flexibilities in TRIPS may be part of the reason that intellectual
property-producing nations seek to negotiate higher intellectual property standards
through bilateral trade agreements or plurilateral agreements like the ACTA and the
TPP. TRIPS consistent value divergence takes a long-term view to the development
of the global intellectual property regime. It also recognizes that values may shift as
local industries develop or as nations gain economic strength. Thus, nurturing an
environment that supports strong intellectual property rights might take ten years
for one nation but thirty years for another. How quickly a pro-intellectual property
environment evolves may also depend on how much is done to enable countries to
develop their own intellectual property industries.
While this Part has focused on TRIPS, as a trade-related intellectual property
agreement that recognizes divergent values, it is worth noting that intellectual
property agreements and national laws which are not trade-related reflect this

281. Id. art. 65, para. 1, art. 65, para. 2 (giving developing countries an additional four
years, for a total of five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, to
fully implement the obligations therein); id. art. 66, para. 1 (giving least-developed countries
an additional ten years to fully implement their TRIPS obligations). However, these time
periods are relatively short for nations that have been working towards economic and
industrial development over the course of several decades. In 2005, WTO members extended
the time period for least developed countries to implement TRIPS under Article 66.1 to
2013. See Decision of Council for TRIPS, supra note 156.
282. TRIPS, supra note 15, at 300 (“Recognizing that intellectual property rights are
private rights.” (emphasis in original)).
283. Supra note 275.
284. See TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to
a balance of rights and obligations.”).
285. Id. at 300 (“Emphasizing the importance of reducing tensions by reaching
strengthened commitments to resolve disputes on trade-related intellectual property issues
through multilateral procedures.” (emphasis in original)).
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divergence of values as well. For instance, the Berne Convention provisions on
moral rights, 286 the Convention on Biological Diversity, 287 and national laws that
protect traditional knowledge reflect a diversity of views. Further, reference in
international agreements to intellectual property rights as human rights is consistent
with an understanding of intellectual property that goes beyond the economic value
of the rights. 288
The next Part of the Article addresses how embracing value divergence can lead
to interest convergence.
B. Value Divergence Facilitates Interest Convergence
Domestic and international intellectual property law and policy influence one
another. 289 A great deal of scholarly critique has contemplated how to
accommodate the needs of developing countries in the international intellectual
property agenda. 290 However, there are also value differences among industrialized
countries. 291 The flexibilities for which developing countries fought are valuable
for all nations and should be encouraged by both industrializing and industrialized
states.
Just as the intellectual property-importing nations should not expect to appeal
purely to the goodwill of intellectual property-generating nations for more
flexibility in accommodating their specific needs, the major intellectual property
producers, like the United States, should not expect that promises of trade-offs in
agriculture or market access will cause intellectual property-importing nations to
internalize a pro-intellectual property rights stance. The strategy may have been
effective in concluding an agreement. But the experience thus far illustrates that
this strategy has its limitations. Certainly, China has formally agreed to protect U.S.

286. Berne Convention, supra note 49, art. 6 bis.
287. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter
CBD].
288. E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc
A/RES/217(III), at 76 (Dec. 10, 1948). Article 27.2 states: “Everyone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.” Id. art. 27, para. 2.
289. Okediji, Regulation of Creativity, supra note 154, at 2382.
290. Compare Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A
TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 139, 160–64 (noting that there
are ways to protect traditional knowledge using the existing TRIPS text), and Kapczynski,
supra note 23 (suggesting that TRIPS offers developing countries a greater degree of
flexibility in the area of pharmaceuticals than has been generally recognized), with Yu,
Objectives, supra note 24 (suggesting that Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS can be used as a “seed”
of development), and Yu, Discontents, supra note 24 (describing how TRIPS can be
interpreted through a “pro-development lens”).
291. The Canada Pharmaceutical dispute serves as an example. See supra Part VI.B. Note
also, for instance, the divergent approaches of the United States and the European Union
with respect to the protection of geographical indications. See Long, supra note 118, at 222–
23.
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intellectual property. 292 However, as the USTR notes, it appears that eliminating
copyright piracy is not something the government of China is necessarily interested
in pursuing. 293
Various factors will determine the role a given nation believes its patent and
copyright laws should play in society. These may include the level of economic
development, the national history, and the social and economic goals. All these
elements affect the societal values, including factors such as whether the society is
more individualistic or more communitarian in nature. The convergence of
intellectual property interests will not necessarily happen organically but it is
something that can be facilitated in the long-term by creating a favorable
environment. The right environment is necessary for global intellectual property
law to move toward increased intellectual property rights for all nations. 294 Because
intellectual property rights have economic, social, and even political implications,
this enabling environment can be nurtured over time. Thus, promoting social and
economic development is a way to generate mutually beneficial and, thus, more
easily enforceable, intellectual property norms. This can be achieved by allowing
nations to tailor intellectual property laws to suit their national objectives to the
maximum extent permitted by TRIPS. 295
Countries with relatively similar cultural backgrounds and levels of economic
development diverge in their societal values and their domestic assessment of the
appropriate intellectual property balance. It is questionable, therefore, to require all
WTO members, including developing and emerging economies, to abide by
standards that are arguably better suited to the goals of intellectual propertyproducing nations. 296 These standards, as they have been interpreted, may not even

292. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S.-China Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade 2010: China Agrees to Significant IP Rights Enforcement, Market
Opening, and Revisions to Indigenous Innovation Policies that Will Help Boost U.S. Exports
(Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2010/december/us-china-joint-commission-commerce-and-trade-2010. The press
release noted the following:
“China agreed to a series of intellectual property rights commitments that will
protect American jobs. The commitments build on China’s recently announced
Special Campaign against counterfeiting and piracy,” Ambassador Kirk said.
“These commitments will have systemic consequences for the protection of
U.S. innovation and creativity in China. We expect to see concrete and
measurable results, including increased purchase and use of legal software,
steps to eradicate the piracy of electronic journals, more effective rules for
addressing Internet piracy, and a crack down on landlords who rent space to
counterfeiters in China.”
Id.
293. 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 19–20.
294. Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 132.
295. Subsequent bilateral and plurilateral agreements should retain the flexibilities
established in TRIPS.
296. 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 15 (noting that, although developing countries were
required to implement their TRIPS obligations by January 2005, many are still in the process
of establishing intellectual property mechanisms that the USTR considers to be adequate and
effective).
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suit the national conditions or societal goals of similarly situated industrialized
countries. 297 Value divergence can be seen through a positive, rather than negative,
lens. WTO panels and trade negotiators should, in accordance with the balancing
function in TRIPS, acknowledge that each society has a distinct national identity,
and that its treatment of intellectual property law may reflect its national identity,
its goals, and its values.
1. Tailoring Intellectual Property Laws To Support National Objectives
International intellectual property treaties that predated TRIPS 298 allowed
nations more scope to tailor their copyright or patent laws to suit their national
circumstances. Thus, countries agreed to provide patent protection, for instance, but
some countries elected not to patent medicines. 299 TRIPS differs from these longstanding treaties because the scope for tailoring intellectual property law to suit
domestic needs has been significantly curtailed. Also, the pressure to become a
party to these international agreements was much less significant than the pressure
to join the WTO. Whereas membership in the WTO affects a nation’s ability to
benefit from greater market access, the benefits of becoming a party to the Berne
Convention or the Paris Convention are limited to those relating to intellectual and
industrial property.
If TRIPS is, as Professor Correa suggests, an attempt to stifle competition by
developing countries, the interests of innovators and imitators could appear to be
diametrically opposite. 300 It may be that TRIPS, however, was driven by
technological protectionism and by the desire to have industrializing countries
become markets for consumption. However, too much intellectual property
protection might destroy not only the competition but also the purchasing market. If
consumers do not have the economic wealth to purchase the copyrighted or
patented goods, it will continue to be difficult for them to buy such goods. If the
countries that are not highly technologically innovative constitute an important
market for the intellectual property-generating countries, then it is, arguably, also in
the interest of the technology-producing countries not only to permit but also to
encourage such countries to tailor intellectual property agreements to suit their
needs. 301

297. See Canada Panel Report, supra note 224.
298. Berne Convention, supra note 49; Paris Convention, supra note 50.
299. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 23, at 1576–78 (discussing India’s prohibition on
patented medicines prior to TRIPS).
300. See CORREA, supra note 60, at 3–5 (explaining TRIPS as being part of American
policy to create international rules that would counter its declining, competitive position in
the global market place and identifying a number of factors that converged to make
intellectual property significant for the United States. These included the growing
importance of technology in international competition, the reduction or elimination of trade
barriers, and the decline in U.S. supremacy in manufacturing.).
301. Id. at 5 (arguing that TRIPS was part of “a policy of ‘technological protectionism’
aimed at consolidating an international division of labour whereunder Northern countries
generate innovations and Southern countries constitute the market for the resulting products
and services”).
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Moreover, for some nations copyright policy, for example, may be primarily
cultural policy whereas for others it may be a matter of sound economic policy. On
the other hand, for some countries, the prevailing motive may be the advancement
of certain basic human rights and promoting access to affordable knowledge goods.
The U.S. government advocates strong intellectual property rights because this is
seen to be in the interest of U.S. industries. 302 This has only been somewhat
effective. 303 It cannot be in the long-term interest of Canada, or newly emerging
and developing nations, like India and Ghana, for instance, to advance U.S.
business interests and intellectual property priorities over their own intellectual
property priorities. 304 How the balance is determined must remain national, not
global. This is because the role intellectual property plays is economic, social, and
cultural. It is closely tied to a nation’s history, level of development, philosophy,
and goals. 305

302. 301 REPORT, supra note 37, at 5 (explaining that part of the role of the USTR is to
protect U.S. intellectual property overseas to the benefit of American businesses and their
employees).
303. The China-U.S. dispute is one example. See supra Part VI.A.
304. Responding to U.S. pressure, Canada, in its recently tabled legislation, mirrors the
language of the United States’ DMCA. See B. C-32, 40th Parliament, 3d Sess. § 41 (Can.
2010). The Canadian provision mirroring the DMCA digital lock provision has been the
most controversial provision in the bill. In part, this is because the language of the WCT is
fairly broad and does not require the treaty to be implemented in a specific way. See Michael
Geist, Long-Awaited Copyright Reform Plan Flawed, but Flexible, TORONTO STAR, June 3,
2010 (“Despite a national copyright consultation that soundly rejected inflexible protections
for digital locks on CDs, DVDs, e-books, and other devices, the government has caved to
American pressure and brought back rules that mirror those found in the United States.”);
Canadian Music Creators Coalition, Copyright Reform Bill Doesn’t Help Canadian Artists,
(June 12, 2010), http://www.musiccreators.ca/wp/?p=264. The Coalition also notes that most
new Canadian music is not promoted by major record labels, who focus mostly on foreign
acts and calls on the government of Canada to support the Canadian cultural scene. Id.;
Kashif Admed & Eric Miller, Copyright Reform Needs ‘Made in Canada’ Approach,
VANCOUVER SUN, June 11, 2010 (“Although U.S. interests may be best served by instituting
strong protection laws, Canada could allow consumers to bypass technological protections
for personal use and still meet its international obligations.”); Graham F. Scott, How
Canada’s New Copyright Law Threatens To Make Culture Criminals of Us All, THIS MAG.
(Sept. 17, 2010), http://this.org/magazine/2010/09/17/fair-copyright/ (“Under C-32 as
currently written, circumventing any digital lock would be a crime, even if the purpose were
legal. With this measure, the bill legitimizes the sinister notion that large corporate interests
are entitled to broad, intrusive powers to control how individuals consume culture.”);
Michael Geist, The Canadian DMCA: What You Can Do, MICHAEL GEIST’S BLOG (Dec. 2,
2007), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/2431/125/. Thus, national values impact
respect for, and adherence to, domestic intellectual property laws, even when those laws are
driven by global forces.
305. Furthermore, intellectual property is philosophically more challenging to justify than
real property because it is entirely a legal construct. One cannot say, with respect to
intellectual property, that possession is nine-tenths of the law because the intangible cannot
be possessed and controlled like a physical object. See Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
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As discussed, Canada and the United States are neighbors with many
similarities, but they are also fundamentally different in certain ways that shape
national intellectual property policy. Examples of the distinct cultural attitudes
between the United States and Canada are evident from Canada’s emphasis on
public health care, public education—including public colleges and universities—
and the availability of low-cost medicines. 306 The desire to keep the costs of
medicines low was central to the Canadian position in the WTO Canada
Pharmaceutical dispute. 307 This can be contrasted to the value the United States
places on the free market, including privatized health care, private education, and
the absence of price controls on pharmaceutical products. As compared to the
United States, with its emphasis on the free market, Canada, with its emphasis on
public access, may also place a higher value on access to affordable knowledge
goods and the dissemination of information than on the commodity value of
intellectual property goods. In the United States, the economic view of the role of
intellectual property as a way to stimulate innovation appears to be the current,
dominant cultural view. 308 By comparison, Canadian copyright policy, for instance,
appears to be a mix of the economic goals and the promotion of culture and cultural
heritage. 309
It is not the right time to advance a maximalist global intellectual property
agenda. 310 To the contrary, it is a valid intellectual property strategy to foster
economic development and to put public welfare needs ahead of the desire to
promote private economic gain. Historically, patent and copyright laws have been
weak when countries have been developing economically. 311 Economic studies
indicate that strong intellectual property rights are useful when economic
development is relatively high and countries are producing, not just consuming,
intellectual property-protected goods. 312 Thus, some countries will still be inclined

306. For a general analysis of some Canada-U.S. cultural differences, see SEYMOUR
MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA (1990).
307. Canada Panel Report, supra note 224, at 17.
308. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
309. There is no explicit constitutional provision that details the purpose of Canadian
copyright law. Constitution Act, 1999, §§ 91(22), (23) (U.K.). However, the Canadian
copyright policy is split between the Department of Canadian Heritage and Industry Canada,
perhaps reflecting dual purposes of the role of copyright in Canadian society. See Arts and
HERITAGE,
Cultural
Industries,
CANADIAN
http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1266244047506/1266200598020; Canadian Intellectual Property
Office (CIPO), INDUSTRY CANADA, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/eng/h_00075.html.
310. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 93, at 86 (“[T]he international community
should not rush to freeze legal obligations regarding the protection of intellectual property. It
should wait until economists and policymakers better understand the dynamics of innovation
and the role that patent rights play in promoting progress and until there are mechanisms in
place to keep international obligations responsive to developments in science, technology,
and the organization of the creative community.”).
311. DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 155, at 10.
312. Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo Braga, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 19, 22 (Carsten Fink & Keith
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to implement laws that encourage the dissemination of knowledge. Indeed,
promoting sustainable development is consistent with the WTO mandate. For
instance, GATT acknowledges the need “to ensure that developing countries . . .
secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of
their economic development.” 313 Moreover, as part of the Doha Development
Agenda, WTO member states reaffirmed their commitment to sustainable
development. 314
Intellectual property-producing countries can also benefit by supporting policies
directed at creating stable nations rather than promoting laws that, because they are
not suitable, may curtail another nation’s social and economic progress. 315 As local
industries develop, there will be a decrease in value divergence and a
corresponding increase in interest convergence. Naturally, this will vary depending
on the type of intellectual property in question and on the strength of the local
industry. For example, the United States is a major producer of motion pictures,
and its motion picture industry has an interest, therefore, in protecting copyright in
such works. As India has become the world’s largest major film producer, 316 its
industry interests may converge with those of the United States with respect to
protecting copyright in motion pictures. 317
Nonetheless, WTO panels may have a tendency to render panel decisions that
are consistent with the economic, right holder-focused approach that currently
dominates global intellectual property law. Similarly, trade negotiators may be
inclined to follow the same path and address intellectual property from an
economic perspective, including treating intellectual property as an investment
within the context of bilateral investment treaties. 318 However, the commodity
orientation has its limitations. For example, some scholars suggest that the U.S.
emphasis on capitalism, competition, individuality, and private property tends to
promote the commodification of human effort, including many artistic and cultural
products. 319 Others note that the direction intellectual property law has taken in the
United States can have the effect of privileging intellectual property rights holders

E. Maskus eds., 2005) (noting that “the introduction of IPRs stimulates innovation in the
source country and thus increases future trade flows”).
313. GATT 1994, supra note 14, arts. XXXVI, para. 3. GATT, XXXVI (speaking of the
need to encourage sustainable development); see also GATS, supra note 79, art. IV
(speaking to the need to increase the participation of developing countries in world trade).
314. World Trade Organization (WTO) – Doha Ministerial Declaration 2001: Ministerial
Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, para. 6 (2002).
315. See CHANG, supra note 65, at 74 (arguing that free trade may maximize a country’s
consumption but that free trade “is definitely not the best way to develop an economy”).
316. Madhavi Sunder, Bollywood/Hollywood, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 275, 294
(2011) (“Bollywood is the world’s largest film industry and Bollywood films are ‘the
most-seen movies in the world.’” (footnote omitted)).
317. Of course, this can also generate tension. See Emily Wax, Paying the Price for
Hollywood Remakes; Bollywood Facing Copyright Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2009, at
A07.
318. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 258, at 15 (“IP rights hence are generally considered as
protected investments under the US FTAs.”).
319. E.g., Scott, Cultural Property, supra note 107, at 343.
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at the expense of other social and legal considerations. 320 It is not a question of
whether this private economic focus is correct; however, it must be acknowledged
as but one view among others.
This would, at a minimum, militate against rigid interpretations of TRIPS and
suggest a need for greater recognition of the balancing function of TRIPS. 321
Achieving a mutually beneficial and balanced international intellectual property
policy in the current climate may mean accepting minimal standardization,
encouraging flexibility in the interpretation and application of TRIPS and
subsequent agreements, and recognizing the importance of social and economic
value differences in approaches to intellectual property.
Thus, WTO panels and trade negotiators should, in accordance with the
balancing function in TRIPS, acknowledge that each society has a distinct national
identity and that its treatment of intellectual property law may reflect its national
identity, goals, and values. At most, there should be an approximation of measures
to the extent necessary to avoid impediments to trade, but not a harmonization of
measures. 322 This can be achieved by looking for areas of mutual interest without
restricting our understanding of intellectual property policy by interpreting it
through a narrow economic lens. Embracing this kind of diversity is more likely to
create a richer, more complex system: one that challenges us to respect value
divergence.
C. What If There Is No Middle Ground?
Countries like the United States, which play a leadership role in the global
community, have set the tone and the direction of international intellectual property
policy, for better or worse. 323 Thus, many of the intellectual property standards that
have been adopted make good short-term business sense for the United States.
In light of the history of TRIPS and the subsequent agreements, one might query
whether it is possible to find areas of global policy agreement on intellectual
property. High standards of copyright or patent protection are reasonable for
nations that have established industries that require intellectual property protection,
but the same laws do not necessarily make sense for nations that do not have welldeveloped copyright or patent industries. This could lead one to conclude that

320. E.g., Chander, Exporting DMCA, supra note 111 (noting Margaret Jane Radin’s
suggestion that policy arguments about property in the digital environment take explicit
cognizance of other policy considerations that tend to bound propertization: contractual
ordering, competition, and freedom of expression).
321. See supra Part VI.A.
322. Sherwood, supra note 17, at 46 (“Harmonization of intellectual property protection
may not be realized any time soon. Yet it may not be necessary or even very useful. It may,
as a matter of utility, be sufficient to reach diverse levels of protection which are nonetheless
congruent enough that people are able to make investment and commercialization decisions
without worrying about system differences. In other words, when the non-congruent
differences can be left to the lawyers, a working equivalent of harmonization may well have
been reached.”).
323. Harris, supra note 181, at 186 (noting that the United States, European Union, and
Japan (and the industries within these countries) are the forces most responsible for TRIPS).
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interests will not converge to support high intellectual property rights for all nations
at this time, or perhaps at any time.
To suggest that seeking shared interest in global intellectual property standards
is futile would amount to an acknowledgement and recognition that strong
intellectual property rights are being promoted even though they are simply not
advantageous for many nations at this time. Moreover, to conclude that agreement
is not possible would be an acknowledgement that there was and is not a mutually
beneficial arrangement, but that TRIPS is indeed equivalent to a coercive
contract. 324 It undermines the trade-based approach to global intellectual property
because an agreement in form without substance is of little value.
The other point of resistance may be that with this view one would never have a
global standard. For example, the Substantive Patent Law Treaty discussions did
not advance, largely due to resistance from developing countries. 325 Indeed, it
might take longer to achieve change, but the changes implemented are more likely
to take root and to be more effective when there is significant buy-in. Ideally, there
should be overarching, general standards but not necessarily to the level of detail
that we have seen in the implementation of TRIPS and “TRIPS-plus” agreements.
For example, the Berne Convention set standards, but it also allowed for a great
deal of flexibility. TRIPS, as observed earlier, differs from previous intellectual
property treaties because it is more detailed and the obligations are enforceable as
part of the trade regime. 326 However, the problem lies not simply with TRIPS but
with the fact that WTO panels have chosen to interpret TRIPS obligations and
exceptions in light of the private economic interests of the right holder. 327
Unfortunately, this adopts and reinforces a narrow economic paradigm and
understanding of intellectual property, which is being replicated in other
agreements.
In theory, dissatisfied nations could opt to function outside of the WTO system
and bear the consequences of such a decision. This would be extremely challenging
for small economies that need access to the markets of larger economies at
reasonable tariff rates. What appears to be a choice may amount to no choice at all.
Furthermore, the multilateral setting provides smaller countries the opportunity to
forge alliances with similarly situated countries, thereby finding strength in
number.
It is worth noting that trade-based intellectual property agreements differ from
many of the international treaties that are the subject of compliance scholarship in
international law. International law scholars often focus on strategies for getting
states to comply with international human rights instruments or environmental
laws. 328 The distinction between intellectual property agreements, human rights
treaties, and environmental law treaties is that human rights and environmental

324. Id.
325. See WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, at 4–5, 19–21, WIPO Doc.
SCP/10/11 (June 1, 2005); WIPO, Memorandum from the WIPO Standing Comm. on the
Law of Patents, at 1–3, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 (Mar. 17, 2004); Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra
note 93.
326. See TRIPS, supra note 15.
327. See supra Part VI.B (discussing the Canada Pharmaceutical dispute).
328. See Hathaway, supra note 183.

2012]

VALUE DIVERGENCE

1693

regulations are aimed at improving the human condition. The same cannot be
categorically said for trade-related intellectual property rights. Unlike human rights,
intellectual property rights are private economic rights. In the context of intellectual
property, tensions arise around the enforcement of the rights in order to further
private economic interests despite other public interests that may be at stake. Yet,
intellectual property rights may or may not be beneficial to a society depending on
the level of economic development. 329 Additionally, intellectual property rights,
while they can have some positive effect, can also have detrimental effects on the
cost and accessibility of the basic necessities, such as seeds for crops, medicines,
and educational materials. 330
The question is whether nations can be pressured into internalizing intellectual
property laws that they do not value or that do not serve their goals and interests.
Perhaps this can be done to some extent, but this can equally create resistance in
various forms. For example, even if the government of a country, like China,
recognizes the value of intellectual property rights, it may not have adequate
infrastructure to enforce the laws. 331 Hence, when the United States initiated its
WTO dispute with China, the laws required by TRIPS had already been
implemented. 332
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that values shape the agenda. Intellectual property
regimes, like real property systems—whether individualistic or communitarian—
are influenced by societal values. Through value divergence, interest convergence
can be sought, encouraged, and developed over time. This is important for the
global intellectual property regime because intellectual property rights are not
purely trade-based commodities and should not be treated as a purely trade matter.
Clearly, the goal of the United States and the other intellectual property
producers is to ensure more adequate enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Yet, scholars and nongovernmental organizations have raised the alarm about the
trend in international intellectual property, including the recently concluded ACTA

329. See Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property Rights
and What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
312, at 1, 13.
330. Mattias Ganslandt, Keith E. Maskus & Eina V. Wong, Developing and Distributing
Essential Medicines to Poor Countries: The DEFEND Proposal, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 311, at 207, 207–09.
331. Peter K. Yu, The U.S.-China Dispute over TRIPS Enforcement, 5 DRAKE
OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL. PROP. L. 8–9 (2010) (noting that there is local resistance to
change in China. Further, the problems China faces are not unlike the problems the United
States faces with counterfeiting. Professor Yu points out that counterfeit goods are readily
found in major U.S. cities and that U.S. authorities place low priority on pursuing piracy and
counterfeiting cases, particularly in light of more pressing concerns, like terrorism.).
332. Id. at 7 (“[C]hallenging China on non-implementation grounds is likely to be very
difficult, as most of the laws required under the TRIPS Agreement are already on the
books . . . . [T]he problem with intellectual property protection in China is no longer with its
laws, but rather with the enforcement of those laws.”).
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text. If the U.S. global intellectual property strategy is to be successful in the longterm, it must be based predominantly on mutually beneficial agreement rather than
on agreement that is achieved primarily through coercion. In other words, U.S.
intellectual property goals will be facilitated by employing value divergence to
stimulate the convergence of intellectual property interests in the long-term. The
results may be less apparent in the short-term but are more likely to lead to
effective long-term change.
Moreover, mutually beneficial agreement on global intellectual property is
important because patent and copyright laws have implications for social issues
beyond intellectual property law. Professor Yu suggests that there is a need for a
development-friendly lens towards the interpretation of TRIPS. 333 Social
development and economic interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Businesses may support education, for instance, for moral reasons, but it is also
something that businesses need for market reasons. 334 Ultimately, a developmentfriendly lens is a humanity-friendly lens, as well as a business-friendly lens.
Professor Schoenbaum suggests that in this modern age of the “global village,”
the United States cannot be seen to consistently be acting in its own self-interest. 335
It is in the interest of the United States to be seen to be a leader, acting in the
interests of humanity. 336 Looking beyond intellectual property, there is a growing
convergence of interests among states in peace, security, and stability. 337
Ultimately, because what happens in one nation affects what happens in another, it
is essential to consider human needs in addition to private economic considerations.
This value divergence approach to the development of international intellectual
property law and policy is more likely to bring long-term success because laws that

333. Yu, Objectives, supra note 24, at 1027.
334. ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER 195 (1969). Berle argues that a successful industrial
system requires a number of factors, and he identifies education as the single greatest
component. Id. He explains the need for an educated and trained work force but also a
sophisticated consumer to purchase the products of industrialization. Id. He states,
“[b]usinessmen may want an educated public for humanistic reasons; but they need it for
market reasons. Illiterates are poor consumers.” Id. (emphasis in original).
335. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE PATH NOT TAKEN: USING
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROMOTE WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY 54 (2006) (“As the
preeminent global power, the United States cannot appear to be acting as if its own
self-interest is all that matters.”).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 54; see James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance in WTO Reform, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 885, 915–16 (2004) (“I argue in favor of giving equal priority to leveling
the playing field of international trade and commerce between developing and developed
countries as an important pre-condition for establishing the trust and confidence in the
system of global commerce among countries with different sources of competitive
advantage. In addition, the fair competition resulting from leveling the playing field would
give developing countries, including countries in the Middle East, a chance not only to feed
their people, but perhaps even lay the basis for a middle-class that would in turn help build
on the emerging democracies in the South. As a surplus or spin-off, elimination of subsidies
in rich Western countries would most likely reduce the conditions of frustration and
hopelessness among young people likely to be attracted by those interested in recruiting
terrorists.” (footnote omitted)).
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are seen to be more legitimate are more likely to be internalized and fully
implemented. This, in turn, will lead to a more robust regime. Rather than striving
to minimize differences, WTO member states, dispute resolution panels, and
national trade negotiators should embrace these differences to the maximum extent
possible. Additionally, the flexibilities established in TRIPS should be retained in
subsequent bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral intellectual property agreements.
Although the legitimacy of TRIPS has been called into question, it is not too late
to restore legitimacy to the Agreement. Rather, it depends on how TRIPS is
interpreted and applied. If TRIPS were to be interpreted in its context, which
includes the preamble, 338 and in light of its objectives, then it would not be
interpreted in a manner that necessarily prioritizes the private economic interests of
the right holder over competing societal values and public interest considerations,
including public economic interests. Embracing value divergence in the treatment
of intellectual property rights in bilateral and plurilateral agreements is also
relevant and appropriate. Finally, working to foster interest convergence by
allowing value divergence advances the trade policy goal of promoting harmonious
relations because it signals mutual respect rather than dominance. This long-term
approach is more likely to lead to a more complex, richer, and ultimately more
balanced global intellectual property system.

338. Vienna Convention, supra note 275, art. 31.

